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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on industrial organization and environmental economics. The
first essay models the efficient pricing structure when consumers respond to average price rather than
marginal price. Regulators have been using increasing block tariffs to regulate important markets such
as water and electricity, although such tariffs are not shown to be efficient in the standard literature of indus-
trial organization. In light of recent evidence regarding how consumers respond to complex price schedules,
this essay re-examines the regulated non-linear pricing. Results show that increasing per-unit prices (hence
increasing block tariffs) may be optimal when consumers respond to changes in average price rather than
marginal price. This suggests the equity-efficiency trade-off associated with increasing block tariffs may be
less severe than previously believed.
The second and the third chapters study the garbage industry. In the United States, waste has been
transported across county lines and state borders. Several states and counties have attempted to legalize
transboundary waste flow controls in several Congress sessions after their ordinances were overturned by
Supreme Court. Using data on intercounty waste flows in California and a random utility model of haulers’
decisions about where to deposit waste from each county, the second essay studies the effects of not-in-my-
backyard policies and fuel taxes on the spatial and demographic distribution of solid waste. I find that waste
is currently more likely to be hauled to disposal facilities in communities with higher percentages of blacks
and Hispanics, even after controlling for income, disposal fees, and transport distances. Counterfactual pol-
icy experiments show that policies that seek to limit waste flows would reduce intercounty waste transport.
However, these policies tend to lead to substitution of waste away from facilities near white residents and
toward facilities near Hispanic residents, potentially exacerbating distributional concerns.
In the third chapter, I look at the residential mobility hypothesis to explain the uneven distribution of
waste by demographics. Forming sound environmental justice policy involves understanding whether the
correlation between race and environmental bads results from the disproportionate siting of locally unwanted
land uses or nuisance-driven residential mobility. This essay presents evidence of residential sorting using
a difference-in-difference strategy. Specifically, I compare changes in population after an opening (and
closing) of a trash site between blocks within one mile to faraway blocks. Results show a 11 percent
decrease in white population and a 44 percent increase in Hispanic population in a block after a trash site
opened within one mile. Closing the site does not change white population immediately while inducing a
11 percent fall in Hispanic population, relative to the operating period.
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Chapter 1
Nonlinear Pricing, Biased Consumers, and
Regulatory Policy
Price schedules with increasing block tariffs have been used by policy makers to regulate important
markets such as water and electricity. Regulators sometimes argue that increasing block tariffs promote
equity, resource conservation, and revenue stability. However, such tariffs are usually not argued to promote
efficiency. This paper re-examines regulated non-linear pricing in light of recent evidence regarding how
consumers respond to complex price schedules. Ito (2013) shows that, when confronted with complex price
schedules, electricity customers respond to changes in average price (AP) rather than to changes in marginal
price (MP). This paper characterizes the optimal regulated non-linear pricing when consumers respond to
changes in average price. Optimal pricing under AP response behavior is shown to be independent of the
consumer type distribution. A key result is that, fixing consumer preferences and the type distribution, in-
creasing per-unit prices may be optimal when consumers respond to AP, while decreasing per-unit prices are
optimal when consumers respond to MP. These results suggest that the equity-efficiency trade-off associated
with increasing block tariffs may be less severe than previously believed.
1.1 Introduction
Nonlinear price schedules are observed for many goods and services. Firms offer quantity discounts on
auto rentals, hotel room stays, and a wide variety of consumer goods. Cell phone service providers have
complex nonlinear prices based on menus of three-part tariffs. Seminal papers by Mirrlees (1971), Spence
(1977), Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Maskin and Riley (1984) show how firms with market power may use
nonlinear pricing to engage in second-degree price discrimination and extract profits in excess of what could
be achieved via uniform pricing. Profit-maximizing nonlinear price schedules exhibit decreasing marginal
prices (i.e. quantity discounts) for a wide variety of environments, with the highest consumer type paying a
marginal price equal to the firm’s marginal cost.
Regulated firms also employ nonlinear pricing. For example, many regulated public utilities charge
increasing block tariffs, in which consumers are charged higher marginal prices for higher consumed quan-
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tities. From an economic efficiency standpoint, increasing marginal price (IMP) schedule for a regulated
firm is a puzzle. Suppose that the firm operates with economies of scale and the regulator wishes to set
prices so as to maximize welfare subject to a break-even constraint for the firm. Then second-best opti-
mal prices require distortions away from marginal cost, but these distortions will typically involve smaller
mark-ups of marginal price over marginal cost for higher quantities; that is, decreasing marginal prices
(which also follows the results in the context of non-regulated nonlinear pricing by Mirrlees (1971) and
Maskin and Riley (1984)). The IMPs, represented by increasing block tariffs, however, are charged by
many regulated public utilities since they are often argued to promote distributional goals.1 For example,
when energy costs increase significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, many electric utilities raised marginal rates
on high-consumption service tiers, while keeping marginal rates low on lower tiers to protect lower income
consumers. This, hence, points to the presence of an equity-efficiency trade-off for regulators, whereby
distributional goals for pricing are achieved only by sacrificing efficiency. Borenstein (2012) provides evi-
dence regarding the efficiency cost of increasing block tariffs used by California electric utilities though he
analyzes the distortion away from setting an alternative flat rate schedule.
In this paper, we offer a different perspective on the equity-efficiency trade-off for price regulation. This
perspective is based on recent empirical evidence on biased consumer responses to complex nonlinear price
schedules. Ito (2014) uses customer billing data to examine how household electricity customers in Cali-
fornia respond to changes in increasing block tariffs. He provides several types of empirical tests to show
that consumers respond to changes in the average price of electricity, rather than to changes in marginal
price. We formulate and analyze a nonlinear pricing model to show that biased consumer responses to price
changes can have dramatic effects on second-best optimal prices. For reasonable configurations of con-
sumer preferences and distributions of consumer types, the shape of the second-best optimal nonlinear price
schedule may be reversed for average price response (APR) consumers compared to that for marginal price
response (MPR) consumers. In particular, second-best prices for APR consumers may involve increasing
marginal prices whereas second-best prices for MPR consumers involve decreasing marginal prices. This
finding suggests that regulated increasing marginal prices may not imply an equity-efficiency trade-off, or
that this trade-off may not be as significant as prior studies have suggested.
Our model is built on the standard literature of monopolist’s nonlinear pricing in Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Stole (2007). We extend to also consider regulated nonlinear pricing
in which the regulator designs the price that maximizes social welfare subject to a break-even constraint
on the monopolist’s profits. However, we depart from standard literature by assuming consumers respond
to average price instead of marginal price. This price misperception is due to the misspecified beliefs of
the nonlinear structures of prices, subsidies, and tax schedules.2 Hence, consumers who face a possibly
nonlinear pricing menu act as if they faced a linear price in which marginal rates were also average rates.
Assuming APR, we find that optimal price schedule does not depend on the consumer’s type distribu-
tion. Moreover, given a fixed preference, the optimal price schedule may exhibit increasing marginal prices
under APR whereas it is decreasing marginal prices under MPR. This implies that increasing marginal price
1See for example, Wichelns (2013), who also argues that increasing block tariffs promote energy conservation goals.
2see evidences on Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004), Liebman (1998), and Fujii and Hawley (1988) on tax rates; Ito (2013),
Borenstein (2009) on electricity price; and Carter and Milon (2005), and Saez (2010) on water price.
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schedules in the world of biased consumers with APR may achieve double goals of efficiency and equity.
We also examine the welfare and the welfare distribution by the type of consumers between pricing
in the world of APR and pricing in the world of MPR. Compared to the society with optimally pricing in
the world of MPR, the regulated pricing solution in the world of APR may lead to a society with a higher
welfare owing to a higher consumer surplus. That is because pricing in the world of APR may result in
a lower marginal price schedule than pricing in the world of MPR. There may be a situation in which the
welfare between the two worlds is the same. However, in such situation, pricing in the world of APR leads
to a more favored distribution in consumer surplus. Particularly, low type consumers (who consume a low
amount of goods) obtain more benefits in the world of APR pricing than in the world of MPR in two aspects.
First, low type consumers who could not afford the goods in the world of MPR pricing are able to consume
a positive amount in the world of APR pricing. Second, for low type consumers who can consume the goods
in both worlds, low type consumers in the world of APR obtain higher surplus than in the world of MPR
pricing. This is, again, because of a lower marginal price schedule in the world of APR, which reduces the
distortion when pricing away the marginal cost. The deadweight loss caused by pricing away the marginal
cost is mitigated to transfer into the consumer surplus.
There is a longstanding interest in studying misbehavior of consumers. In markets with nonlinear price
schedules such as public utility pricing and taxation, Saez (2010) and Borenstein (2009) show that rational
consumers respond to expected marginal price due to the presence of uncertainty about consumption. Using
a general perceived price form that allows all three possible perceptions (marginal price, expected marginal
price, average price), Ito (2014) provides strong empirical evidence that consumers respond to average price.
Esponda and Pouzo (2016) develop a theoretical framework to explain the misspecified behaviors as called
Berk-Nash equilibrium. They explain APR as a self Berk-Nash equilibrium in which a consumer has a
misspecified subjective belief of the unit costs, leading her to act as if she faced a linear price though she
faces a possibly nonlinear price schedule. We formulate the optimal regulated pricing when such price
misperception in consumers is taken into account.
A growing literature of behavioral economics in industrial organization also examines how firms react
to and in some cases exploit biased or suboptimal responses of consumers to complex pricing. Those studies
suggest consumers have non-standard preferences (eg. loss aversion, or present bias), are overconfident or
fail to choose the best price due to suboptimal search, etc (readers can refer to a comprehensive survey by
DellaVigna (2009)). For example, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) and Spiegler (2012) suggest that loss aver-
sion may create kinks in demand curves, which can lead to price rigidities. Courty and Hao (2000); Eliaz
and Spiegler (2008); Grubb (2009) study monopoly screening problem or price discrimination when con-
sumers are overconfident. Grubb (2009), especially, analyzes nonlinear pricing by a monopoly cell phone
service provider. Consumers in his model are uncertain of their desired consumption level when they select
a pricing plan and in addition exhibit a biased underestimate of the variance of desired consumption. The
monopolist exploits this bias by offering a three-part tariff similar to commonly observed cell phone plans;
a fixed fee, a set quantity of service with zero marginal price, and a high marginal price for overages above
the set quantity. We consider the monopoly pricing and regulated pricing when consumers misperceive non-
linear prices as linear prices and hence respond to average prices instead of marginal prices. Our model help
12
Chapter 1 Ho (2019)
explain the optimality of increasing marginal prices.
The shape of nonlinear price schedules is also especially important in taxation literature. The opti-
mal shape of income tax rate has been well studied in Mirrlees (1971), Diamond (1998), and Dahan and
Strawczynski (2000). Before the study by Diamond (1998), most analysis of optimal taxation supported
decreasing marginal tax rates at high levels of income (see summary in Dahan and Strawczynski (2000)).
Nevertheless, Diamond (1998) and the later comment by Dahan and Strawczynski (2000) demonstrated that
the utility form and the worker skill distribution (equivalent to the consumer type distribution in product
and service markets) account for the optimal tax rate shapes. The optimal tax rate, hence, may be increas-
ing or U-shaped. We also consider the effect of utility form and type distribution on the shape of optimal
marginal price but more importantly, the effect of APR rather than MPR. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004)
propose a “schmeduling” suboptimization in which consumers use average price as an approximation of
marginal price due to the substantial cognitive cost of understanding complex pricing. Although Liebman
and Zeckhauser (2004) model the scenario in which people respond to average tax rate, they do not study
the impact on optimal tax shape. Furthermore, it is important to note that the nonlinear pricing model in
labor economics, while similar to other product and service markets, exhibits significant differences in op-
timization constraints and in how uncertainty of the type of a consumer enters the preferences. Outside of
labor economics (except Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004)), an exception that models the nonlinear pricing
in APR is Sobel (1984). However, he only considers the conditions in which the monopolist optimal pricing
schedule under APR has decreasing marginal prices. He does not fully contrast welfare between APR world
and MPR world nor the distribution in welfare by the type of consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the misperceived behaviors and
the behavioral theory behind APR. Section 1.3 outlines the two pricing solutions—monopoly pricing and
regulated firm pricing when consumers respond to marginal prices and when consumers respond to average
prices. Section 1.4 presents the implications of APR pricing on the structure of the optimal price schedules.
Section 1.5 shows the welfare implications. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Modeling Average Price Response Behavior
In the monopoly pricing problem, the firm designs the price schedule (the pairs of price rate and con-
sumption quantity) that maximizes expected profits given that consumers facing the price schedule will
select the consumption to maximize individual utilities. That constraint is known as the incentive constraint
where each type of consumers selects their own prescribed consumption and does not have incentive to buy
the other consumptions (that are designed for other types).
In the world of MPR, a consumer of type θ selects a demand q(θ) in order to maximize their utility
taking the entire total price schedule P (q) as considered. Formally, it is written as
q(θ) solves max U(q, θ, P (q)) for each θ (1.1)
Under the conventional utility function U(q, θ, P (q)) = U(q, θ) − P (q), it is clear that the consumer of
type θ compares the marginal utility to marginal price and opts to choose quantity q(θ) at which marginal
13
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utility equals marginal price, i.e q(θ) such that Uq(q(θ), θ) = Pq(q(θ)) (subscripts denote derivatives).
In the world of APR, a consumer of type θ selects a demand q(θ) such that Uq(q(θ), θ) = P (q(θ))/q(θ).
That is because consumers misperceive the marginal price or the entire total price schedule because they
have limited understanding of the price schedule or find the nonlinear price complicated to understand. We
further elaborate the theory behind APR as follows.
Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) identify conditions in three categories that can discourage people from
perceiving the incentives at the margin. First, complexity, e.g. due to the nonlinear structure, makes it hard
to determine marginal prices and costly to know where one is on the price schedule. Second, the connection
between a consumer’s choice and consumption is difficult to observe, especially in purchasing electricity
and water. For example, how many kilowatts of electricity are used to cook a meal, and how much it costs
to cook that meal is even more difficult to perceive. Third, nonstationary environment is not conducive for
consumers to learning. Different seasons often lead consumers to stay at very different points on the price
schedule (more heating is demanded in the winter). The pricing schedules are usually not displayed on
the monthly bills and even the bills are presented in an incomprehensible measure such as kilowatts. The
monthly payment also aggregates hundreds of disparate single activities (turning on the light, running the
refrigerator, using the heater etc.) Therefore, Liebman and Zeckhauser propose that consumers perceive (or
treat) the average price as the marginal price. This, which they call ironing, is because people smooth over
the entire range of the schedule. “One decides whether to lower the heater by noting that $300 per month
represents an average price of 60 cents per therm, rather than 89 cents for the last (or next) therm of natural
gas.” (pg. 14).
In fact, Hortac¸su et al. (2015) imply a high possibility of APR instead of MPR behaviors. They docu-
ment that the Public Utility Commission of Texas created a website that shows all available retail electricity
provider options in order to inform consumers and provide transparency to the search process. That web-
site, however, only displays average rates instead of marginal rates at different consumption plans. Such
instruction may unintentionally lead consumers to focus on average prices rather than marginal prices.
Of course, people who are fiercely rational or who face very simple pricing schemes may know exactly
their location on the price schedules and respond to marginal price. Some may use first-differencing to
estimate marginal price or compare their own situation to that of a similar person to infer marginal price.
Nevertheless, compared to marginal price, much less information is required to calculate average price (only
the total payment and quantity are sufficient). Given the substantial cognitive cost of understanding complex
pricing, consumers may respond to the average price of total payment as an approximation of their marginal
price. This is empirically supported by Ito (2014). He shows that consumers do respond to price but they
only perceive average price instead of marginal price because they are inattentive to the price schedule. In
his model, he recovers the perceived price as p˜(x) =
∫
p(x − )w()d where p(x) is the marginal price
of the price schedule, x is the consumption quantity, and w() is uniformly distributed over [0, x]. In other
words, consumers perceive the average price as the marginal prices weighted by uniformly distributed noise
at smaller quantities. This is appropriate to the theory in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) proposing that
consumers smooth over the entire range of the schedule and thus treat the average price as the marginal
price.
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All of the above papers, however, do not provide a formal theory to explain why consumers cannot learn
about the marginal prices even if consumers may realize different average prices at different quantities.
Sobel (1984) suggests a consumer who demands q(θ) thinks that she faces a linear price schedule with
constant unit charge equal to P (q(θ))/q(θ). In a formal model, it is written as:
q(θ) solves max U(q, θ, P (q(θ))/q(θ)) (1.2)
A reason for that, he explains, is that the consumer knows only the total amount she actually must pay for this
purchase, not the entire price schedule. Sobel (1984) shows that consumers’ behaviors adjust dynamically
towards an APR convergence. The process suggests consumers respond to average prices because they
know only the quantity and the total cost of their purchases. A consumer begins by making a purchase of q0
and then learns about the value of P (q0). She makes the next demand under the assumption that the price is
linear and the unit price is P (q0)/q0. In general, the consumer makes her nth purchase assuming the average
price of the (n − 1)th purchase is the constant unit cost. Sobel (1984) shows that this adjustment process
converges to the problem (1.2). However, his theory of adjustment process is given under the conditions that
lead to a decreasing marginal price schedule in the world of APR. The process cannot explain APR behavior
in all types of price schedules.
A recent theory developed by Esponda and Pouzo (2016) can explain APR behaviors of consumers.
They propose a concept of Berk-Nash equilibrium to model agents with misspecified environment. That is,
instead of assuming people have a correctly specified view of their environment, each player is characterized
by a subjective model which describes the set of feasible beliefs over payoff-relevant consequences as a
function of actions. In a Berk-Nash equilibrium, each player follows a strategy that is optimal given her best
fit belief. The notion of best fit belief is formalized in terms of minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence,
which is endogenous and depends on the equilibrium strategy profile.
Applying their framework to the nonlinear pricing context, we see that the true environment is the
set of all possible unit costs Y = {y ∈ R : y = p(q)/q, q ∈ R}. The consumer incorrectly believes
that she faces a (possibly random) linear price y ∈ Y that does not depend on her choice. Her mis-
specified subjective model is the set of all probability distributions over Y. That is, Θ = ∆(Y) where
θ = (θ1, . . . , θk) ∈ Θ and θj denotes the probability that the linear price is P (qj)/qj . The consumer’s
strategy is denoted by σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) ∈ ∆(Q), where σj is the probability that the consumer chooses
quantity qj . Esponda and Pouzo (2016) show that for a strategy σ, the weighted Kullback-Leibler divergence
function is K(σ, θ) =
∑k
j=1 σj ln
1
θj
and the unique minimizer is θ(σ) = (σ1, . . . , σk). Given such best fit
belief, the strategy σ also maximizes the consumer’s surplus {U(q)−
(∑k
j=1(P (qj)/qj)σj
)
q}. Thus, σ is
a Berk-Nash equilibrium. A special case of σ that defines a pure strategy qj and the belief of the linear price
with unit cost P (qj)/qj with probability of one is also a Berk-Nash equilibrium. This implies APR is a pure
strategy Berk-Nash equilibrium.
Our model that characterizes nonlinear pricing in the world of APR fits with the APR behavior that is
resulted from a pure strategy Berk-Nash equilibrium.
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1.3 Defining Nonlinear Pricing Solutions
We consider the setting as in the standard model in Mirrlees (1971); Mussa and Rosen (1978) Maskin
and Riley (1984); Wilson (1993). Given the total price schedule P (q), a type-θ consumer whose preference
is U(q, θ) has the surplus U(q, θ) − P (q) over the combination of quantity q and type θ; one-dimension
type θ is distributed on Θ = [θ0, θ1] with density f(θ) and distribution F (θ). Assume that the outside
option of not consuming is zero and firm faces a per-consumer cost C(q) that is convex. Subscripts denote
partial derivatives. Superscript m, a denotes the scenario where the consumer responds to marginal price
and average price, respectively.
Assumption 1. Consumers’ preferences satisfy:
1. Uqq < 0
2. Uq > 0
3. Uθ > 0
4. Uqθ > 0
5. Uqθ + qUqqθ > 0
6. 2Uqq + qUqqq < 0
The first two assumptions ensure the positive marginal utility of consumption and the law of diminishing
marginal utility. The third assumption aims to order the utility in the type of consumers. The fourth implies
that the consumers with a higher type enjoy a higher marginal utility across every q (this is usually referred
as the single-crossing condition). The last two assumptions guarantee monotonicity of consumption in
consumer type under AP response price schedule.
It worths noticing that the consumer inverse demand in general is Uq(q, θ) = Dθ(q) ≡ Perceived Unit
Price. Under MP response, the consumer inverse demand is Uq(q, θ) = Pq(q) ≡MP . Under AP response,
the consumer inverse demand is Uq(q, θ) = P (q)/q ≡ AP .
We now define two pricing solutions, monopoly pricing and the regulated firm pricing (second-best
pricing), for each case of price response behaviors.3
1.3.1 Monopoly Pricing Solution
Monopoly Pricing Under Marginal Price Response
As in the standard literature, the firm chooses the price schedule Pm(q) to maximize expected profits
subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rational (IR) constraints.
max
Pm(·)
∫ θ1
θ0
Pm(Qm(θ))− C(Qm(θ))dF (θ) (1.3)
subject to Qm(θ) = argmaxq≥0U(q, θ)− Pm(q) [IC] (1.4)
U(Qm(θ))− Pm(Qm(θ)) ≥ 0 [IR] (1.5)
3Later, we can see that the two pricing solutions share a similar form of mark-up ratio formula and even the first best pricing
can be included in that formula.
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The standard results in the literature are that the optimal consumption Qm = max{qm(θ), 0} where qm(θ)
is nondecreasing and satisfies (see appendix A for more detailed results):
Uq − Cq = 1− F
f
· Uqθ (1.6)
It should be noticed that the optimal price schedule Pm(q) has the marginal price equal to marginal utility
and hence, we can rewrite equation 1.6:
MP −MC
MP
=
Uq − Cq
Uq
=
1− F
f
· Uqθ
Uq
(1.7)
To interpret this formula, fix a quantity q and consider the demand for the qth unit of consumption. This unit
has the price pm, which is the marginal price since consumers are responding to marginal price. In other
words, we have the marginal price demand in this case. The proportion of consumers willing to buy this unit
is
D(pm) ≡ 1− F (θ∗(pm)) (1.8)
⇒ dD(p
m)
dpm
= f(θ∗(pm))
dθ
dpm
(1.9)
where θ∗(pm) denotes the type of consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the qth unit
at marginal price pm:
Uq(q, θ(p
m)) = pm (1.10)
⇒ Uqθdθ = dpm (1.11)
⇒ dθ
dpm
=
1
Uqθ
(1.12)
Therefore,
dD(pm)
dpm
· p
m
D(pm)
=
f(θ∗(pm))
1− F (θ∗(pm)) ·
pm
Uqθ
(1.13)
Note that pm = Uq, hence
MP −MC
MP
=
Uq − Cq
Uq
=
1
f
1−F
· Uqθ
Uq
=
1

(1.14)
This means that the monopolist’s mark-up ratio depends on the marginal price elasticity of demand of the
qth unit.
17
Chapter 1 Ho (2019)
Monopoly Pricing Under Average Price Response
As mentioned in section 1.2, under the APR case, the constraint (1.4) is replaced by the ex post behav-
ioral incentive constraint:
Uq =
P a
q
(1.15)
The monopoly pricing solution is to choose the price schedule P a(q) to maximize expected profits:
max
Pa(·)
∫ θ1
θ0
P a(Qa(θ))− C(Qa(θ))dF (θ) (1.16)
subject to Qa(θ) : Uq(Qa(θ)), θ)) =
P a(Q(θ))
Q(θ)
(1.17)
U(q, θ)− qUq(q, θ) ≥ 0 (1.18)
The profit maximization of the monopolist is transformed to
max
q
∫ θ1
θ0
(qUq(q, θ)− C(q))dF (θ) (1.19)
subject to U(q, θ)− qUq(q, θ) ≥ 0 (1.20)
Since the constraint 1.20 is satisfied so long as the consumption is nonnegative, solving the problem requires
maximizing the intergrand qUq(q, θ)−C(q). This means that finding the monopolist’s optimal AP response
price schedule involves finding the most profitable uniform price for each θ-type consumer, and choosing the
price schedule so that the average price for each type is equal to that corresponding most profitable uniform
prices. The formal first order condition is at each θ:
Uq + qUqq − Cq = 0 (1.21)
Uq − Cq = −qUqq (1.22)
Apply the implicit function theorem to the above equation, we can see the change in optimal consumption
in consumer type as follows:
dq
dθ
= − Uqθ + qUqqθ
2Uqq + qUqqq − Cqq (1.23)
The assumptions (4) and (5) on the utility function and the weak convexity of the cost ensures the mono-
tonicity and the uniqueness of the optimal consumption for each consumer type (dq/dθ > 0). Since the
monopolist shall designs the average price at the marginal utility of the optimal consumption, the price
schedule is well defined in the sense that each consumer type facing such price schedule finds only one
optimal consumption.
Lemma 1. When the consumer responds to average price, the optimal consumption Qa = max{qa(θ), 0}
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where qa(θ) satisfies:
Uq − Cq = −qUqq (1.24)
The optimal price schedule satisfies:
Uq =
P a
q
(1.25)
Equation 1.24 can be rewritten as:
Uq − Cq
Uq
=
−qUqq
Uq
(1.26)
We now try to interpret the above mark up ratio by considering the average price demand in this case. Fix
a type of consumer, the consumer of this type is different between buying and not buying the qth unit by
comparing the marginal utility with the average price pa of that unit:
Uq(q, θ) = p
a (1.27)
⇒ Uqqdq = dpa (1.28)
⇒ −qUqq
Uq
= −dp
a
dq
· q
pa
≡ 1
η
(1.29)
Therefore, we get
AP −MC
AP
=
Uq − Cq
Uq
=
−qUqq
Uq
=
1
η
(1.30)
which means that the monopolist’s mark-up price ratio depends on the average price elasticity of demand
for each type of consumers since consumers respond to average price.
1.3.2 Regulated Firm Pricing (Second-best Pricing Solution)
Monopolist is often regulated by the price at which total welfare is maximized subject to the monopolist’s
profit at a fixed rate, often a break-even rate to just cover enough fixed costs F . This pricing method is also
called Ramsey pricing which often refers to multiproduct contexts. We will consider the regulated monopoly
pricing under MP response and under AP response. In fact, it later turns out that monopoly pricing and the
regulated monopoly pricing, and even the first best solution, share a similar pricing form.
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Regulated Firm Pricing Under Marginal Price Response
The regulator maximizes the social welfare subject to a constraint on the supplier’s profit.
max
Pm(·)
∫ θ1
θ0
U(Qm(θ), θ)− C(Qm(θ))dF (θ) (1.31)
subject to
∫ θ1
θ0
Pm(Qm(θ))− C(Qm(θ))dF (θ) = FC [Profit constraint] (1.32)
Qm(θ) = argmaxq≥0U(q, θ)− Pm(q) [IC constraint] (1.33)
U(Qm(θ))− Pm(Qm(θ)) ≥ 0 [IR constraint] (1.34)
Solving this problem (see Appendix B for more detail) yields that the optimal consumption qm =
max{Qm(θ), 0} where qm(θ) satisfies:
Uq − Cq =
(
λm
1 + λm
)
·
(
1− F
f
· Uqθ
)
(1.35)
where λm is the Lagrangian multiplier for the monopolist’s profit constraint. The Lagrangian term λm,
hence, has the interpretation that it is the marginal increase in welfare associated with a decrease in firm
profit.
Notice this means
MP −MC
MP
=
Rm

(1.36)
where Rm ≡ λm1+λm is a constant number and Rm ∈ (0, 1) and  is the marginal price elasticity of demand
for qth unit across all types.
 =
f
1− F ·
Uq
Uqθ
(1.37)
Regulated Firm Pricing Under Average Price Response
In contrast to the case where consumers respond to marginal price: Uq = Pmq , the consumers here
respond to average price (since they are not able to articulate the marginal price and use average as an
estimate of marginal price to reason):
Uq =
P a
q
(1.38)
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Therefore, the profit maximization of the monopolist is transfered to
max
q
∫ θ1
θ0
(U(q, θ)− C(q))dF (θ) (1.39)
subject to
∫ θ1
θ0
(qUq(q, θ)− C(q))dF (θ) = FC (1.40)
U(q, θ)− qUq(q, θ) ≥ 0 [IR constraint] (1.41)
Since the IR constraint is satisfied so long as the consumption is nonnegative, we have the following FOC
(with the Lagrangian multiplier λa for the profit constraint):
Uq − Cq + λa(Uq + qUqq − Cq) = 0 (1.42)
Uq − Cq = λ
a
1 + λa
· (−qUqq) (1.43)
Theorem 1 (Regulated firm pricing under AP response). When the consumer responds to average price and
under regulated pricing scheme, the optimal consumption qa = max{Qa(θ), 0} where q = Qa(θ) satisfies:
Uq − Cq = λ
a
1 + λa
· (−qUqq) (1.44)
The optimal price schedule satisfies:
Uq =
P a
q
(1.45)

This implies
Uq − Cq
Uq
=
λa
1 + λa
· −qUqq
Uq
(1.46)
⇔ AP −MC
AP
=
Ra
η
(1.47)
where η is the average price elasticity of demand for qth unit for each of the types of consumers. Similar to
the MP response scenario,Ra is a constant between 0 and 1.
The optimal mark-up price ratios imply that the monopoly pricing and the regulated firm pricing share
a similar form.
Under MP response Under AP response (1.48)
MP −MC
MP
=
R(m)

AP −MC
AP
=
R(a)
η
(1.49)
It can be seen that the monopoly pricing, the first-best pricing, and the regulated monopoly pricing are
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encompassed by R = 1, R = 0, and 0 < R < 1, or by λ → ∞, λ = 0, 0 < λ < ∞, respectively4. In this
paper, we call the constantR the policy number.
1.4 Pricing Structure Implications
In this section, we will consider the implications of the price response behaviors on the optimal price
schedules. Recall that the two pricing solutions share the similar form (1.49), the proofs will use that general
form although the intuition will be provided by working with the monopoly pricing for tractability.
Corollary. When consumers respond to average price, the optimal pricing schedule does not depend on the
consumer type distribution.
Proof. Remind that the optimal pricing schedule under AP response satisfies the equations 1.15 and 1.24,
which are independent of the type distribution. The intuition for this is that the monopolist can maximize
total profits by maximizing profits point-wise across types.
FIGURE 1.1: Monopolist’s revenue under different response schemes.
Note: The horizontal axis is for quantity, the vertical axis is for the price rate to which consumers respond (either marginal rate or
average rate, depending on how consumers respond to).
4Similar result for Ramsey pricing in the case that consumers respond to marginal price is obtained in Braeutigam (1989),
section 7.3.
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This appears to be surprising since the optimal mark-up pricing schedule under to-marginal-price re-
sponse relies on the type distribution. However, figure 1.1 gives us the reason why. To simplify the argu-
ment, suppose the monopolist has zero cost and only needs to maximize the revenue. Consider any two
types of consumers a, b, that have demand curves AB and CD, respectively. It should be also noticed that
these are demand curve to which price the consumers respond. Hence, the intersection between the demand
curves and the perceived price is the quantity that consumers purchase at a given price rate.
Consider the situation in which consumers respond to average price. If the monopolist designs the price
rate d—average rate to which consumers respond, then the type a consumer responds at point F and type
b responds at point G. The monopolist’s total revenue consists the revenue OEFJ collected in the type
segment a and the revenue OLGK collected in the segment b. We can see that the revenue in each segment
does not depend on the price rate at other quantities except the quantity at which the consumers purchase.
Particularly, the revenue OLGK in type segment b is only determined by the specific design point G and
not affected by other price rates designed at other quantities for other types.
On the contrary, if consumers respond to marginal price then the monopolist shall design the optimal
marginal price scheme. If the marginal price rate is designed as the line d, the monopolist’s revenue obtained
from selling to consumer type a is OIFJ and the revenue obtained in the type segment b is OIGK. We can
see that the price design IG set on the first quantity unit to the final quantity unit (qG) demanded by type b
plays the role as a constraint on how much the monopolist can get from serving the segment b.
In summary, the pairs of price and quantity in the price schedule under AP response scheme are in-
dependent (disjoint relationship) thanks to two features. First, since consumers respond to average price,
the monopolist can be rational by design the average price schedule. Second, the average price points are
independent in the sense that the total revenue generated by any pair of price and quantity in the schedule
does not depend on the other pairs.
The disjoint relationship among the monopolist’s designed pairs of price and quantity when consumers
respond to average price leads to an interesting result. As long as each consumer type demands different
optimal quantities, the monopolist can just focus on maximizing each revenue obtained from selling to each
type of consumers under AP response situation. Such action is in fact a point wise maximization in the
sense that maximizing revenue obtained from selling to each type of consumers implies maximizing total
revenue obtained from serving the whole market. As a result, the optimal price schedule does not depend
on the distribution of consumer types5.
Corollary (Quantity Discount). When consumers respond to marginal price, the optimal pricing schedule
has decreasing marginal rate if the marginal price elasticity of demand across all types of consumers is
increasing in consuming amount.
Corollary (Quantity Premium). When consumers respond to average price, the optimal pricing schedule is
increasing average rate if the average price elasticity of demand for each type of consumers is decreasing
in consumption amount.
5Meanwhile, under to-marginal-price response situation, the price for a qth unit will affect the monopolist’s revenue from selling
to all types that demand quantities at least q units. For that reason, under the MP response situation, the monopolist has to take into
account the type distribution to quantify the weighted demand for the qth unit.
23
Chapter 1 Ho (2019)
It should notice that increasing marginal rate implies the increasing average rate and vice versa.6 Then
the two results here appear to exclude each other but in fact they can hold together. In particular, there are
situations in which the marginal price elasticity is increasing but the average price elasticity is decreasing.
If we have the utility form U(q, θ) = θV (q) then the condition in proposition is equivalent to that the
hazard rate is increasing. This condition is well known in literature by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin
and Riley (1984). Examples of increasing hazard rate include regular distributions such as uniform. Mean-
while, the decreasing hazard rate, for example, Pareto distribution would imply the decreasing marginal rate
pricing schedule.
Corollary. Assume the utility form U(q, θ) = θV (q). When the consumers respond to marginal price, the
optimal pricing schedule is decreasing average rate if the hazard rate of the type distribution is increas-
ing. Meanwhile, when the consumers respond to average price, the optimal pricing schedule is increasing
average rate if the relative curvature −qV
′′
V ′ is increasing.
1.5 Welfare
1.5.1 The Distributional Effects in Consumer Welfare In the World of APR Price Schedule
Remark. In both the monopoly pricing solution and regulated firm pricing solution, APR may lead to a
distributional effects in consumer welfare. Particularly, while both monopolist’s profits and total consumer
surplus are the same between MPR price schedule and APR price schedule, the distribution of consumer
welfare by consumer types is contrast. Low type consumers may benefit in the world of APR price schedule
while suffer in the wolrd of MPR price schedule.
To illustrate this result, we use an example with a quadratic utility function U(q, θ) = (1 + θ)q −
1/2q2 ; C(q) = cq, and fixed cost F . Consumer type is uniformly distributed from 0 to 1, i.e. θ ∼
Uniform[0, 1]. Assume 1 ≤ c ≤ 2.
Marginal Price Response, with Uniform Distributed Type
The cutoff type above which consumers can consume positive amounts of goods is:
θ ≥ c+R
m − 1
Rm + 1 (1.50)
Optimal consumption is
Qm,Uniform(θ) =
{
(Rm + 1)θ −Rm + 1− c, θ ≥ c+Rm−1Rm+1
0, θ < c+R
m−1
Rm+1
(1.51)
6Suppose the price schedule P has the marginal price Pq and average price P/q. The rate change due to the change in q of the
average price is dP/q
dq
=
Pq·q−P
q2
. Consider the function g(q) = qPq − P that has gq = qPqq . Hence, decreasing marginal price
means that Pqq < 0, which implies g(q) is decreasing, i.e. g(p) < g(0) = 0. Hence, Pq · q − P < 0. This means dP/qdq < 0, i.e.
decreasing average price.
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The optimal pricing schedule satisfies
Pm,Uniformq =
c+ 2Rm
Rm + 1 −
Rm
Rm + 1 · q, for θ ≥
c+Rm − 1
Rm + 1 (1.52)
Expected profits before the fixed cost:
Epim,Uniform =
Rm
3(Rm + 1)2 (2− c)
3 (1.53)
Consumer surplus and expected consumer surplus:
CSm,Uniform =
((Rm + 1)θ − c−Rm + 1)2
2(Rm + 1) for θ ≥
c+Rm − 1
Rm + 1 (1.54)
E[CSm] =
(2− c)3
6(Rm + 1)2 (1.55)
Average Price Response, with Uniform Distributed Type
The cutoff type above which consumers can consume positive amounts of goods is:
θ ≥ c− 1 (1.56)
This cutoff type is higher than the cutoff type under MP response case since c+R
m−1
Rm+1 ≥ c− 1 ∀Rm ≥ 0.
The optimal consumption is
Qa,Uniform(θ) =
{
θ+1−c
Ra+1 , θ ≥ c− 1
0, θ < c− 1 (1.57)
The optimal pricing schedule satisfies
AP a,Uniform = Raq + c, for θ ≥ c− 1 (1.58)
Expected profits before the fixed cost:
Epia,Uniform =
Ra
3(Ra + 1)2 (2− c)
3 (1.59)
Consumer surplus and expected consumer surplus:
CSa =
(θ − c+ 1)2
2(Ra + 1)2 for θ ≥ c− 1 (1.60)
E[CSa] =
(2− c)3
6(Ra + 1)2 (1.61)
We see that in both the case of monopoly pricing (Rm = Ra = 1) and the case of regulated firm pricing,
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the expected before-the-fixed-cost profits remain unchanged:
Epim,Uniform = Epia,Uniform (1.62)
The same as the expected consumer surplus, and hence social welfare (since Rm = Ra due to the constant
profit constraint in the regulated firm pricing andRm = Ra = 1 in the monopoly pricing):
E[CSa,Uniform] = E[CSm,Uniform] (1.63)
However, the price response behaviors lead to a surplus distribution that favors equity view. Notice the
change in the difference in consumer surplus between APR and MPR as consumer type changes:
For those types who can buy the goods, i.e. θ ≥ c/2:
CSa,Uniform − CSm,Uniform = − R
2(R+ 1)2
[
(R2 + 3R+ 3)θ2 − 2(R2 +R+Rc+ 2c− 1)θ
+R2 + 2Rc+ c2 −R− 1] (1.64)
While for those consumer types who are not able to buy the goods under MPR price schedule, i.e. for all
θ ∈ [c− 1; c/2): CSa,Uniform > 0 = CSm,Uniform
FIGURE 1.2: The difference in consumer surplus between the APR scheme and the MPR scheme in the case of
uniform distribution.
Note: The horizontal axis is for the type θ, the vertical axis is for the difference in consumer surplusCSm,Uniform−CSa,Uniform.
Parameter values are c = 1,R = 0.6.
Notice CSa,Uniform > 0 = CSm,Uniform, for θ ∈ (0, 0.5). For θ ∈ (0.5, 1), the difference in consumer surplus is depicted as
in this graph.
Figure 1.2 graphs an example of the difference in consumer surplus between the APR scheme and the
MPR scheme based on the relation (1.64). We can see that low type benefits from APR in two points. First,
there are some low types can consume the goods under APR but not under MPR (the type θ between c− 1
and c/2). Second, among the consumers that buy the goods (θ ≥ c/2), the low types get higher surplus
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under APR than MPR while the high types get smaller surplus under APR. Therefore, even though the
expected social welfare under the two price response cases are the same, the high types in fact subsidize the
low types under APR case.
That story can also be captured in figure 1.3. Figure 1.3 shows the optimal price schedules under APR
FIGURE 1.3: The regulated price design under APR and MPR in the case of uniform distribution and linear demands
Note: There are two optimal price schedules corresponding to two price response behaviors. When consumers respond to marginal
price, the regulator opts to design MP = 1.375− 0.375q. When consumers respond to average price, the regulator opts to design
AP = 0.6q + 1. Under the quadratic utility function and uniform distribution of consumer type, the APR price schedule is IUP
while the MPR price schedule is DUP.
and MPR in the case of R = 0.6 and c = 1. We can see that those consumer types between θ1 to θ2
could not pay for the goods under MPR price schedule though they can under APR price schedule. That
is because the price rate under MPR price schedule is much higher than the price rate under APR price
schedule. Such price rate gap remains until the intersection quantity point F in the graph. This, therefore,
implies that among consumers who can pay for the goods under both price response cases, there still exists
the low types – between θ2 and θ3 – who enjoy larger surplus under APR price schedule than under MPR
price schedule (while the high types from θ3 to θ4 experience a contrary situation).
1.5.2 Suboptimal Behavior May Increase Social Welfare Compared To Standard Optimal
Behavior
Remark. In the monopoly pricing solution, the firm may get better off and consumers are worse off for the
APR of the consumers.
In the regulated firm pricing solution, APR price schedule may lead to an increase in welfare compared to
MPR pricing.
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To formally verify the above remark, we will work with a quadratic utility function that leads to lin-
ear demands, and the Pareto distribution of the consumer type. Specifically, let U(q, θ) = (1 + θ)q −
1/2q2 ; C(q) = cq, and a fixed cost F . The consumer type follows Pareto distribution with scale s > 0
and shape α > 0 that has the following probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) respectively:
f(x) =
αsα
xα+1
(1.65)
F (x) = 1− s
α
xα
(1.66)
The hazard rate f(θ)1−F (θ) =
α
θ . See figure 1.4 for the density shape of Pareto distribution under different
values of parameters. An important note is the support of Pareto distribution is (s,∞). If we think the
type is represented by income, Pareto distribution is appropriate to depict an economy where everyone has
a definitely positive income amount and there is no restriction on the highest income amount someone can
earn.
FIGURE 1.4: Pareto density with scale s = 1 and different shape κ.
We first present the main results in MPR case and APR case then discuss the results under monopoly
pricing and regulated firm pricing. Recall that the monopoly pricing and regulated firm pricing share the
similar pricing form using the policy numberR in the mark-up ratio. The monopoly pricing corresponds to
the case R = 1 and the regulated firm pricing corresponds to the case R ∈ (0, 1). We have the following
results:
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Marginal Price Response With Pareto Distributed Type
The cutoff type above which consumers can consume a positive amount of goods is:
θ ≥ c− 1
1−Rm/α (1.67)
The optimal consumption is
Qm,Pareto(θ) =
{ (
1− Rmα
)
θ + 1− c, θ ≥ c−11−Rm/α
0, otherwise
(1.68)
The optimal pricing schedule satisfies
MPm,Pareto = Pm,Paretoq =
(
1
1− Rmα
− 1
)
q +
c− 1
1− Rmα
+ 1 (1.69)
Expected before-the-fixed-cost profits:
Epim,Pareto =
(
1− Rmα
)αRm(c− 1)2−αsα
(α−Rm)(α− 2) , for α > 2 and c− 1 ≥ s (1.70)
Expected consumer surplus:
E[CSm,Pareto] =
(c− 1)2−αα2sα (1− Rmα )α+1
(α−Rm)2(α− 1)(α− 2) , for α > 2 and c− 1 ≥ s (1.71)
Average Price Response with Pareto Distributed Type
The cutoff type above which consumers can consume positive amounts of goods is:
θ ≥ c− 1 (1.72)
The optimal consumption is
Qa,Pareto(θ) =
{
θ+1−c
1+Ra , θ ≥ c− 1
0, θ < c− 1 (1.73)
The optimal pricing schedule satisfies
AP a,Pareto = Raq + c, θ ≥ c− 1 (1.74)
Expected before-the-fixed-cost profits:
Epia,Pareto =
2Ra(c− 1)2−αsα
(Ra + 1)2(α− 2)(α− 1) , for α > 2 and c− 1 ≥ s (1.75)
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Expected consumer surplus:
E[CSa,Pareto] =
sα(c− 1)2−α
(Ra + 1)2(α− 2)(α− 1) , , for α > 2 and c− 1 ≥ s (1.76)
Welfare Implication Under Monopoly Pricing
Under monopoly pricing solution (Rm = Ra = 1), we see that
Epim,Pareto < Epia,Pareto (1.77)
This means that the monopolist gets better off due to the inattention to the price of consumers. When
consumers respond to average price, they would face a higher increasing slope of the average rate price
schedule than under MPR scenario. The steeper increasing unit rate price schedule would bring higher
before-the-fixed-cost profits to the monopolist. This also implies that consumers in general would get worse
off for their biased behaviors and indeed, we have:
E[CSa,Pareto]− E[CSm,Pareto] = −
(
1− 14
(
1− 1α
)1−α)
α2sα(c− 1)3
(α− 2)(α− 1)3(c− 1)α+1 (1− 1α)1−α < 0 (1.78)
Welfare Implication Under Regulated Firm Pricing
We are interested in the existence of the situation in which the regulated firm can covers fixed costs to
break even while the social welfare is higher under APR than MPR. We will show that such situation exists
under appropriate policy parametersRa,Rm and distribution parameter α.
The monopolist’s before-the-fixed-cost profits are regulated to a fixed return to cover just enough the
same fixed costs under both APR and MPR. That is, the constant Ramsey numbersRm andRa satisfy:(
1− Rmα
)αRm(c− 1)2−αsα
(α−Rm)(α− 2) = FC =
2Ra(c− 1)2−αsα
(Ra + 1)2(α− 2)(α− 1) , for α > 2 and c− 1 ≥ s (1.79)
⇒
(
1− R
m
α
)α−1 Rm
α
=
2Ra
(Ra + 1)2 (α− 1) (1.80)
Notice the difference in expected consumer surplus (same as in expected social welfare since the expected
variable profits equal to the fixed cost F ) between the two price response cases is:
E[CSa,Pareto]− E[CSm,Pareto] = s
α(c− 1)2−α
(α− 1)(α− 2)
(
(Ra + 1)−2 −
(
1− R
m
α
)α−1)
(1.81)
Using the equation 1.80, we have
E[CSa,Pareto]− E[CSm,Pareto] = s
α(c− 1)2−α
(α− 1)(α− 2)(R
a + 1)−2
(
1− 2 · R
a
Rm ·
α
α− 1
)
(1.82)
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Hence, the regulated monopoly pricing under APR will lead to higher social welfare than under MPR as
long as the policy allows parametersRm,Ra appropriately to demand distribution environment α such that
the relation (1.80) holds and R
a
Rm <
α−1
2α . An example is the policy that induces Rm = 0.5 when α = 3,
which leads toRa = 0.154.
Figure 1.5 shows the change in optimal price schedules when changing from monopoly pricing to regu-
lated firm pricing and from MPR to APR. In monopoly pricing scheme, a steeper unit rate and lower starting
point price schedule is charged under APR. This generates larger variable profits for the monopolist while
makes consumers worse off overall. A small number of low type consumers can purchase at a lower price
leading to a smaller deadweight loss compared to the MPR (deadweight loss HKG smaller than IJG).
However, most of the consumers are worse off for paying a higher price at B rather than at C due to the
biased APR.
Once restricted by the profit constraint, the monopolist is forced to charged at a lower mark up ratios:
Both price schedules under APR and MPR become flatter. Interestingly, the policy may induce a higher unit
rate price schedule under MPR than under APR (since both optimal unit rate price schedules are increasing,
the marginal rate should be above the average rate to allow the same generated variable profits). The welfare
under APR schedule, hence, would be higher than under MPR (for smaller deadweight loss is arised).
1.6 Conclusion
From an economic efficiency standpoint, increasing marginal price schedule for a monopolist and for
a regulated firm is a puzzle since the literature of nonlinear pricing implies the optimal price schedule
has decreasing marginal prices. However, recent evidence points out that electricity consumers respond to
changes in average prices rather than to changes in marginal prices due to the complexity of nonlinear price
schedules, see Ito (2014). We characterize optimal nonlinear prices in the world of APR consumers. We
show that the optimal nonlinear price schedule may have increasing marginal prices, thereby implying that
the increase block tariffs used by regulators may achieve the double goals of efficiency and equity.
In the world of APR, under price regulation, the new nonlinear price schedule may lead to a higher
social welfare than the price schedule in the world of MPR. It should be noticed that the social welfare in the
world of APR under unregulated firm pricing schedules is lower than in the world of MPR. This implies that
consumers get worse off due to their biased APR and the monopolist can exploit it under unregulated prices.
However, the regulated pricing can mitigate the deadweight loss due to the bias and improve efficiency.
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(A) Deadweight loss in monopoly pricing
(B) Deadweight loss in regulated firm pricing
FIGURE 1.5: Deadweight loss in optimal monopoly pricing and regulated firm pricing.
Note: The horizontal axis is for quantity q, the vertical axis is for the responding (perceived) price p. Parameter values are
c = 1.5, α = 3. In monopoly pricing,Rm = 1 = Ra. In regulated firm pricing,Rm = 0.5,Ra = 0.15.
The binding profit constraint in regulated firm pricing makes both the optimal marginal price and average price schedules flatter.
However, their slopes have changed at different speed, leading to the regulated marginal price schedule above the regulated average
price in the end. Therefore, the deadweight loss under APR is smaller then under MPR, in regulated firm pricing scheme.
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If Not in My Backyard, Where? The
Distributional Effects of Restricting
Interjurisdictional Waste Flows
Several state and local governments have attempted to legalize interjurisdictional waste flow controls
in several Congress sessions after their ordinances were overturned by Supreme Court. Using data on
intercounty waste flows in California and a random utility model of haulers’ decisions about where to deposit
waste from each county, this paper studies the effects of not-in-my-backyard policies and fuel taxes on the
spatial and demographic distribution of solid waste. I find that waste is currently more likely to be hauled
to disposal facilities in communities with higher percentages of blacks and Hispanics, even after controlling
for income, disposal fees, and transport distances. Counterfactual policy experiments show that policies that
seek to limit waste flows would reduce intercounty waste transport. However, these policies tend to lead to
substitution of waste away from facilities near white residents and toward facilities near Hispanic residents,
potentially exacerbating distributional concerns.
2.1 Introduction
Every year the United States generates more than two hundred million tons of solid waste.1 Where to
dispose of this trash is a long-running question because of the externalities associated with the transport
and disposal of solid waste. To avoid becoming a repository for waste from adjacent places, several state
and local governments have attempted to restrict waste imports since the late 1970s. The concern for envi-
ronmental protection can be magnified when disadvantaged groups and/or minorities are disproportionately
exposed to trash placement.
This paper studies the effects of environmental protection policies on the spatial and demographic dis-
tribution of waste disposal. I use a novel data set on solid waste flows by origin county and by destination
1Short tons are referred unless specified. In 2015, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2016) reports that there are 262
million tons of solid waste generated.
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facility in California to explore the effects of several “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) policies, such as
county bans on out-of-county imports and county taxes on imports. These NIMBY policies are of interest
because a number of federal bills have been proposed to allow state and local governments to restrict in-
terjurisdictional waste flows.2 Additionally, I explore the effects of a fuel tax, an important environmental
regulation that aims to reduce pollution and the possibility of global warming. Although a fuel tax is not
directly targeted at the solid waste industry, it is advocated to compensate for the externality of transporting
an environmental nuisance, such as trash, along its route.
To study the effects of these policies, I employ a structural econometric approach because I do not
observe market outcomes where the trade barriers actually happened. The one intercounty waste restriction
that occurred in California was during a period for which data are not available. In 1984 Solano county
enacted Measure E that limited out-of-county imports, but it was prevented from enforcing the measure in
1992 due to a concern about violating the Commerce Clause. Several states and local governments have
attempted to restrict waste imports from adjacent places since the late 1970s, but their enactments have
been challenged by Supreme Court decisions. Legislative efforts to limit interstate waste flows have been
introduced in several bills in Congress but none of these bills have passed.
To account for the fact that waste flows are the result of economic incentives in the industry, I study the
haulers’ decisions about where to deposit their collected waste by modeling their preferences for disposal
prices, transport distance, and facility quality (captured by facility fixed effects). Modeling the choice of
haulers is also important because it explains why there are waste flows from one trash generation county
to multiple destination facilities.3 The hauler may exploit the variation in disposal prices to cart waste
to a distant disposal facility even though the facility is outside the county of waste origin. My model is
an application of a multinomial logit discrete choice model using aggregate data at the market level (see
McFadden (1974); Berry (1994); Berry et al. (1995)). However, to fit the features of the solid waste industry
correctly, the model differs from the conventional model in two respects. First, I include observations of zero
waste quantity to avoid selection bias from restricting observations to those with positive quantities. Second,
my model does not have an outside option because picked-up trash must be disposed of at some disposal
facility. The estimation shows that the estimated transportation cost is $0.43 per ton-mile given diesel prices
at the 2000 level ($1.672/gal). This agrees with the estimates from several publications, such as $0.46 per
ton mile for shipping cement in Miller and Osborne (2014), $0.29–$0.35 per ton mile over 1983–2003 for
Class I general freight common carriers (basic truck transport) in Transportation in American (2007, and
$0.16–$0.36 per ton mile for shipping waste in 1990 and 1992 in Fischer et al. (1993).
Given the estimated parameters underling the haulers’ decisions, I quantify how haulers’ decisions about
where to deposit waste would change in several counterfactual scenarios, holding facilities’ characteristics
constant. I consider four counterfactual experiments. The first three policies are proposed NIMBY tools
that allow states and local governments to restrict interjurisdictional waste flows. Specifically, the first is
an import ban that outlaws waste flows across county border lines. The second is an import tax that taxes
tipping fees of all waste that flows across county lines at a fixed rate. The third is a universal waste tax
2In 2017 Congress proposed the Trash Act to allow state and local governments to fee on out-of-state waste and to restrict
out-of-state waste coming from states that have lower waste handling standards than the receiving state.
3Ley et al. (2000, 2002) model the social planner’s problem.
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that taxes all waste at a fixed rate. This tax is motivated by the case in which everyone wants to protect
themselves and justifies the tax as a means to compensate the communities that are affected by nearby trash
sites. The final policy I consider is a fuel tax that taxes diesel fuel at a fixed rate.
The results show that these policies would reduce the quantity of waste that flows across county lines, as
would the distance haulers transport waste from the population center of a county to a disposal facility. The
import ban and fuel taxes would also reduce the tipping fees haulers pay for waste disposal. This finding
shows that haulers cart waste to disposal facilities outside the waste-generating county for other benefits
rather than tipping fees and distance. These might include high acceptance rates, flexible operation hours,
capacity, loose regulation on nonlocal waste, etc. Forgoing these good quality facilities would result in a
loss of economic surplus for haulers after the policies.
As mentioned above, I focus on not only the spatial distribution of waste flows but also how waste is
distributed across facilities with different local demographics. Examining the demographic distribution of
waste is important because the environmental justice literature has documented an uneven distribution of the
location of environmental hazards among race groups.4 In addressing the question of environmental justice,
I explore how many people live within three miles of a trash site as a share of the county population for each
racial/ethnic group. I then examine the relationship between the demographic composition of the commu-
nities within three miles of a disposal facility and the waste flows that are sent to the facility. The results
emerge three facts. First, there are fewer people of all racial groups near the facilities that receive the most
waste. Second, waste is more likely to be hauled to facilities in high percent minority communities than
white communities. The disparity is eliminated for Asian communities once I control for income, disposal
fees, and distance, but even with these controls, the disparities remain for black communities and Hispanic
communities, suggesting unobserved characteristics of facilities and neighborhoods matter in haulers’ de-
cisions. Third, among facilities outside of the waste-generating county, waste is more likely to be sent to
facilities in black communities. This suggests that policies that reduce intercounty waste would have the
potential to distribute waste more evenly across demographic groups. My structural model can help us un-
derstand whether these policies would direct more waste to facilities in minority communities within the
waste-generating county.
I find that the policies that limit waste flows would generally not lead to a more equitable distribution
of waste. Waste that is sent to facilities near black communities would remain fairly constant. Waste that is
sent to facilities near white residents would be rerouted toward facilities near Hispanic residents, potentially
exacerbating distributional concerns. One potential reason is that these facilities in Hispanic communities
may have low tipping fees and be closer to the population center of the waste-generating county while
facilities near white residents tend to be predominantly in less populated areas.
This paper contributes to a growing number of studies on the waste industry. Greenstone and Gallagher
(2008); Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2011) study the effects of Superfund-sponsored cleanups of haz-
ardous waste sites on housing values. Currie et al. (2011) find that Superfund cleanups reduce the incidence
of congenital anomalies by about 20–25%. A number of papers address industrial organization questions
4see U.S. General Accounting Office (1983); United Church of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice (1987); Mohai and Saha
(2007)
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using solid waste data. Kamita (2001) analyzes the market structure consequences of merger. Salz (2017)
studies the role of intermediaries between businesses and private institutions and private waste carters in
New York trade waste collection market. Kawai (2011) studies auction design when sellers have incentive
to invest for quality improvement in municipal plastic recycling auctions in Japan.
The paper also complements studies that address interstate waste flow controls. In the hazardous waste
market, Levinson (1999a,b) find that interstate waste taxes decrease shipments of waste to states enacting
high taxes, and provided an estimate of the magnitude of tax elasticities. In the solid waste market, Ley
et al. (2000, 2002) find that limitations on the size of shipments can perversely increase interstate waste
shipments since states export smaller volumes to more destinations. They use the aggregate data at the state
level and consider state planners’ problem assuming the demand for waste disposal services is linear and a
competitive equilibrium. My model, however, considers the haulers’ decisions about where to deposit waste
from each county. This accounts for the fact that disposal landfills are differentiated in prices, distances,
and quality, thereby explaining the impacts of environmental protection law that aims to influence prices,
transport costs, and the number of disposal options.
In the environmental justice literature, this paper departs from the literature by addressing the relation
between demographics and waste flows. Previous studies have examined the disproportionate exposure
pattern by focusing on total concentration of hazard at a site; see Baden and Coursey (2002); Depro et al.
(2015). I, on the other hand, distinguish between multiple waste flows from different origins coming to
the facility. This allows me to control for economic factors that determine flows such as disposal price
and transport cost. By focusing on waste flows, I am also able to identify the exposure disparities within
neighborhoods of hazard sites. This contrasts to the literature that has compared demographic composition
between communities within facility’s buffers and extended areas that are far away from hazards; see Baden
and Coursey (2002); Mohai and Saha (2007).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides legislative background of interjuris-
diction waste restrictions. Section 2.3 shows general picture of waste disposals in California and the current
distribution of waste flows by demographics. I emphasize that the inequitable distribution of waste flows by
race and ethnicity is not fully explained by economic factors, namely, income, disposal prices, and transport
distance to a facility. Hence, when modeling the waste flows to study distribution impacts by race, it is
important to include facility fixed effects. Section 2.4 presents the structural model of haulers’ decisions
about where to deposit waste from each county, which is the demand for waste disposal. Section 2.5 reports
results of counterfactual policy experiments. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background: NIMBY Legislation in Solid Waste Industry
The paper focuses on municipal solid waste: the every trash generated by households. Starting in 1976,
the U.S. Congress sought reform of the waste management practices in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). Subtitle D of RCRA aims to develop and encourage methods for solid waste disposal
that are environmentally sound and maximize the utilization of recoverable energy and materials from solid
waste. The subtitle D also places responsibility for solid waste management on states and local governments.
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However, the local waste management has been complicated by the escalation of interjurisdiction waste
transport and contentious NIMBY legislation.
Several states became overwhelmed by the increasing waste imports from others and attempted to limit
these flows by taxing out-of-state waste or even banning waste imports.5 However, these attempts were over-
turned by the Supreme Court’s decisions on the basis that they interfered with interstate commerce.6 These
cases, for example, include a New Jersey statute that prohibited out-of-state waste imports in Philadelphia v.
New Jersey (1978), an Alabama statute that imposed a special fee on out-of-state hazardous waste in Chem-
ical Waste Management Inc., v. Guy Hunt, Governor of Alabama (1992), an Oregon statute that imposed
surcharge on out-of-state solid waste in Oregon Waste Systems Inc. v. Department of Environmental Qual-
ity of the State of Oregon (1994), and a Wisconsin statute that required out-of-state communities to adopt
Wisconsin recycling standards if exporting to Wisconsin facilities in National Solid Waste Management
Association v. Meyer (1999).
The legislative efforts to limit interstate waste transport have been put to a number of crafted bills in
Congresses. In every Congress since 1990, legislation aiming to authorize states to control interstate waste
flows has been introduced but have not been successfully enacted. In 1994, both the House and Senate
passed the “State and Local Government Interstate Waste Control Act” that prohibit a landfill or incinerator
from receiving out-of-state solid waste unless it obtains authorization from the affected local government
to receive such waste. However, the bill was not enacted due to lack of agreement on common language
in enactment.7 In the most recent Congress, 2017-2018, a bill was introduced to both the Senate and the
House under the name Trash Act. This bill aims to allow state and local governments to restrict out-of-state
waste coming from states that have lower waste handling standards than the receiving state and to fee on
out-of-state waste. I study the effects of interstate waste controls on the short-run market outcomes and
welfare when disposal facilities would not change their pricing strategies and capacity investments.
To study interstate waste transport restraints, I use California solid waste quantity data by county of
origin and by disposal facility of destination to model the effects of restraints on intercounty waste trans-
port. While microdata about solid waste amount by place of origin and by disposal facility (landfills and
incinerators) in California are available for a long-time frame, they are not in all other states. Furthermore,
the proposed federal bills were about interstate waste transport, but the interstate waste restrictions could
set a precedent for interjurisdictional waste transport within a state. In 1984 Solano county in California
enacted Measure E that limited imported quantities. It was then prevented from enforcing the measure in
1992 due to a concern about violating the Commerce Clause. In 2009, opponents of the landfill expansion in
Solano filed a lawsuit aiming to reinstate Measure E. However, California passed a bill in 2012 that prohibits
local ordinances from restricting the importation of solid waste into a local privately-owned disposal facility
based on place of origin. The state of South Carolina also prepared a similar Senate Bill 203 in 2013, but
this currently resides in the Senate.
5They reasoned their restriction on the grounds of preventing environmental harm and preserving their own natural resources
that are dwindling landfill spaces.
6The Supreme Court made it clear that under the “dormant” Commerce Clause of the Constitution, states may not erect barriers
to interstate commerce unless Congress has explicitly allowed it.
7Another bill in later session (S. 534 in 1995) that authorizes states to prohibit out-of-state solid waste and to reinforce local
waste flow control ever exercised before 1994 was passed in Senate but retained in the House.
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It is important to notice that interstate waste transport is a special case of a more general waste flow con-
trol. A general waste flow control is about whether state and local governments can designate where solid
waste must be disposed. In C&A Carbone Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York (1994), the Supreme Court
held that flow control also violates the “dormant” Commerce Clause. In a recent case, United Haulers As-
sociation, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (2007), the Supreme Court revealed
a more flexible view on waste flow control. The Supreme Court upheld county ordinances that directed
all locally generated trash to local publicly owned processing facilities, citing that Carbone had presented
a privately owned facility. I do not consider the counterfactual of waste flow control, but I emphasize the
interstate waste transport issue in this paper, leaving general flow control for future study.
2.3 Data
The paper uses three primary data sets. First, I collect data on the quantity of waste flows from Cali-
fornia’s Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle) by county of origin and by facility
of destination quarterly from January 1995 to December 2015. CalRecycle also reports the location of each
facility. Second, I obtain disposal price (tipping fees) data quarterly from Jan 1992 to Dec 2015 from Waste
Business Journal (WBJ), an industry research and analysis company. In the waste industry, tipping fee is
known as the fee charged per ton to unload solid waste at a landfill or transfer station. Third, I use 2010
census data to reflect the most recent picture of the demographic distribution of waste. To depict demo-
graphic information most accurately, I use population and population by race at the block level, obtained
from IPUMS. Since median household income is confidentially restricted at the block level, I use the infor-
mation at the block group level. In addition to these three sources, I collect data from the Energy Information
Agency on California diesel prices and calculate driving distance using Microsoft maps. For more details
about the data and how it was formatted for the analysis, see appendix (B.1).
2.3.1 Waste Disposal In California
Figure (2.1) shows an overview of waste disposal in California from January 1995 to December 2015.
The number of facilities decreases monotonically from nearly 200 facilities in 1995 to about 150 nowadays, a
decline that is especially dramatic right after the national enactment of the RCRA 1994. Average tipping fee
(weighted by waste shipments) plummets in 1997, which may be explained by expansion and consolidations
of several landfills after the RCRA in 1994. Then the fee remains stable around $33.50/ton between 1997
and 2004 before escalating to $42/ton from 2005. The price escalation may be resulted from the increase in
market power after the plunge in the number of facilities.
Figure (2.1d) shows the trend in waste disposal by a county on average, which exhibits clearly seasonal
patterns of waste generation via quarterly fluctuations. Over years, waste disposal has increased but this ex-
panding trend stopped after 2005. The fall in waste disposal after 2005 may be attributed by several reasons.
First, it may follow the fall in consumption and production activities due to the 2008 recessions. Second,
it may be resulted from an increase in recycling to respond to the fall in the number of disposal facilities,
and the growing environmental regulations (and maybe the pressure from counties that host disposal sites in
38
Chapter 2 Ho (2019)
accepting waste imports).
Along with the drop in the number of disposal sites, the proportion of trash that is exported to other
counties rather than being disposed within the generating county is climbing from 15% to nearly 40% over
this period, see figure (2.1e). Closures of nearby disposal facilities also result in an increase in shipping
distance. Figure (2.1c) shows trash is traveling farther and farther to reach a disposal site, from 24 miles in
1995 to 31 miles in 2015. Although waste is traveling farther to disposal facilities, the shipping distance is
in a reasonable economic range. Conversations with waste collection companies as well as to a represen-
tative in National Waste & Recycling Association, a trade association for private sector haulers, recyclers,
composters, and disposal companies, reveal that trucks generally cart waste to a disposal facility that is less
than about 30–45 miles from the place of collection.
Figure (2.1f) confirms that waste amounts decrease in transport distance. It plots the percentage of waste
in California in 2010 that is transported farther than a certain driving distance. The carted waste plummets
quickly from 30 to 60 miles, following by a flat tail (until 700.17 miles in the California waste flow data).
Consequently, when I move to my analysis of waste flows, I limit the analysis to waste flows within 60
miles between the population weighted centroid of the trash-generating county and the destination facility.
I assume each county is an independent market in which households generate municipal solid waste that
must be disposed of. Haulers in the market collect the waste and choose amongst all disposal facilities
within 60 miles of the population-weighted centroid of the county to dispose of waste. Using the 60-mile
market boundary, this paper aims to explain economic incentives underlying these disposal choices, which
makes up more than 90% of the waste generated in California. In the next section, I test the assumption of
60-mile market boundary. Specifically, I examine how trash flows respond to disposal price (tipping fees)
and driving distance by distance from origin county to destination facility.
2.3.2 Market Boundary of Waste Flows
To examine the economic incentives behind trash flows, I estimate the following regression:
qcjt = βdfd(Distancecj) + βpfp(Pricejt) + γct + ηj + cjt (2.1)
where c indicates origin county of waste, j indicates destination facility, and t indicates quarter. The depen-
dent variable qcjt is the waste amount generated in county c to be disposed at facility j in quarter t. Two
key independent variables of interest are Distancecj and Pricejt. Distancecj is the driving distance from
population weighted centroid of the trash-generating county to destination facility. Pricejt is the disposal
price (tipping fees, dollar per ton) charged for disposing every ton of waste in facility j in quarter t. The
effects of distance and price are estimated using a piecewise linear function (linear splines) to explore their
specific marginal effects in different intervals of traveling distance of the waste flow.
I present the results that adjust for different fixed effects. The first specification includes origin county
by quarter fixed effects (γct) and facility fixed effects (ηj). The second specification includes quarter fixed
effects and origin county by facility fixed effects to further test for price response, because price is endoge-
nous due to omitted variables. Of course the price endogeneity problem cannot be solved completely, but
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we will deal with it in the main model later. Here I emphasize the changes in price responses and distance
responses among different knots of travel distances of waste flows.
Figure (2.2) shows the price response and distance response by distance travel knot using the samples
of waste flows (including zero flows) within 120 miles and 150 miles. It plots the coefficients on knots of
Distancecj and Pricejt from the baseline specification (equation (2.1)). Table (2.1) presents the parameter
estimates from the baseline specification (columns 1, 3, 5) and the specification with origin county by
facility fixed effects (columns 2, 4, 6). Both the figure and table show that the negative effects of price and
distance on trash flows are significantly in the first knots of distance, and decrease in distance in term of the
magnitude. Beyond 80–90 miles, trash flows do not respond to price and distance any more. This confirms
our assumption that there is a certain limit of distance under which trash flows economically respond to price
and distance. If waste is transported farther than that limit, it must be an assignment beyond the economic
reasons. For example, there is a disposal rule for certain waste at a certain time. Given that 90% of the waste
in California is transported within 60 miles, trash flows beyond 60 miles may be reporting errors. Figure
(2.1a) show the market boundaries for counties San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Table (2.2) shows summary statistics of the main sample that is used for my analysis, which includes all
combination of flows within 60 miles. Panel A shows the characteristics of the waste flows, and contrasts
the main sample with the raw data of positive flows. The unit of observation is the quarter× origin county×
destination facility. Contrasting waste shipments, distance, tipping fee, total trash generated in a county, and
out-of-county exports, we can see that the sample of waste flows within 60 miles remains typical features of
the whole California picture of waste disposals. On average, a county sends 21 thousand tons of waste to a
facility. The average distance is 37 miles and the average price is $36/ton. Panel B shows the characteristics
of the choice set. The unit of observation is the quarter × origin county. The panel shows the average size
of a market (average trash amount a county generates) is about 175 thousand tons. A county on average
exports 22% of their trash to other counties. On average, haulers in a market have 8 options to transport
their collected waste to.
2.3.3 The Relationship between Race and Waste Flows
As mentioned, we do not only care about spatial distribution of waste flows but also the demographic
distribution. Previous studies have examined the contemporaneous and historical pattern of disproportionate
exposure to environmental hazards of minorities by contrasting demographic composition between commu-
nities within facility’s buffers and extended neighborhoods that are far away from hazards. I on the other
hand focus on another aspect of environmental justice: Are minorities disproportionately exposed to waste
flows? Given that waste flows are resulted from market activities, and from economic incentives of haulers
in trading off between price and distance, are the waste flows explained by other factors associated with de-
mographic characteristics of neighborhoods of trash sites? If waste is distributed inequitably to minorities,
waste flows would have been sent more often to minorities. Before answering this question, I first examine
the population in the affected communities, i.e. who lives near trash.
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Who Lives Near Trash
How near is near? The choice of spatial unit to represent the hosting communities has been subject of
considerable debate in the environmental justice literature. Previous studies have shown that the correla-
tion between environmental hazards and demographics can be quite sensitive to community definitions; see
Anderton et al. (1994); Sheppard et al. (1999); Mennis (2002). Data aggregated at higher levels such as a
county have been documented to be less reliable as indicators of disproportionate burdens than data aggre-
gated to smaller units such as census block groups. But the choice of whether to use blocks, block groups,
or census tracts as community definition may be problematic either. They vary greatly in geographic size.
For example, blocks in California range from 1/1, 000, 000 of a square mile (1 square meter) to more than a
thousand square miles (3 billion square meters). Hence, I aggregate demographic data at available smallest
census units, blocks, to construct demographic data for fixed circle communities centering disposal sites. A
block is considered to be in the affected community, if its centroid location is in the fixed circle centering
the facility. Population count and counts by race at blocks are aggregated for counts in the community.
Information that is not available at block level such as households, is first assigned to block by population
shares from block-group values before being used to assign to community values. So, median household
income at a block is the income at a block group that contains the block.
Panel A in table (2.3) shows the percentage of population who live within a buffer (3 miles, 7 miles, or
15 miles) of a trash site, relative to the population of the county that hosts the site, by race and ethnicity. On
average, only three percent of the population in a county lives within three miles of a waste disposal facility.
However, it appears that minorities are more likely to live near a trash site than white people. This patterns
also persist in larger buffers, 7 miles and 15 miles.
From now, I also define the affected communities as the area within 3 miles of a waste disposal facility.
As mentioned above, using too large entities may dilute the impact of a waste site, since exposures to waste
odor and landfill outreach may be at the most local neighborhoods. For caution, affected communities are
defined as blocks being within 3 miles of a facility.
To examine how the share of the county population that have a waste site in their 3-mile backyards for
each racial/ethnic group relates to the waste amount the site, I estimate the following regression
Affected Levelj = β0 + β1Wastej + β2Incomej + j (2.2)
where j indicates a facility. The dependent variable is the percentage of people of the race group of con-
cern in the county hosting a disposal facility that live within 3 miles of the site, i.e. Affected Levelj =
#people of the race in a facility’s 3-mile bufferj
#people of the race in a facility’s countyj
× 100. Two key control variables are Wastej , the total waste amount
disposed at facility j in 2010, and Incomej , the median household income of people in the 3-mile commu-
nity. Using 2010 decennial census data, the regression is estimated separately for each of four race groups
of concern, white, black, Asian, and Hispanic to explore the differences among race groups in exposure to
the waste amount of a nearby disposal facility.
The coefficients of primary interest are β1. β1 measures the change in percentage of people of the race
group of concern that live in 3-mile affected communities when there is an increase in the waste amount in
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their backyards.
Panel B in table (2.3) reports the estimates. Row 1 shows sharp differences in affected population levels
across the four racial/ethnic groups when income and trash are at zero levels. Row 2 reveals that people in
all race/ethnic groups are fleeing from waste repositories and the drop for white is largest. The percentage of
whites that live within 3 miles of a trash site would drop 2.38 percentage point if one million tons of waste
is sent to the site, compared to 2.11 percentage points of Blacks, 2.06 percentage points of Asians, and 1.79
percentage points of Hispanics. The regression that stacks all four race samples shows that the disparities in
affected population among race groups are not statistically significant.
Overall, we see that there is not many people living near trash, comparing to the county population, and
that there are less people living near a waste disposal site that receives more trash. However, in term of
environmental injustice, let us consider the distribution of waste flows by race and ethnicity in the affected
communities.
The Distribution of Waste Flows By Race in Affected Communities
Table (2.4) reports mean demographics for generating counties and receiving communities (3-mile
nearby communities and receiving counties). The table also contrasts the numbers to the California state
level. For 3-mile nearby communities, the average population is 26,000 persons of which 49.4% are white,
2.7% are black, 8.1% are Asian, and 35.3% are Hispanic. When weighted by trash amount at a facility,
percentages of whites, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics are 44.1%, 3.7%, 13.0%, and 35.7%, respectively. The
differences between unweighted and weighted percentages by race imply that waste is disposed of more
in minority communities and less in white communities. The disparity becomes more apparent when con-
trasting waste weighted demographics in receiving community to generating county. While the percentage
of white is higher in generating county than receiving community, the percentages of Asian and Hispanic
people are lower.
Since waste flows are a result of market activities, I now examine the distribution of waste flows after
controlling for economic incentives of haulers such as price and distance. From now, I also define the
affected communities as the area within 3 miles of a waste disposal facility. As mentioned above, using too
large entities may dilute the impact of a waste site, since exposures to waste odor and landfill outreach may
be at the most local neighborhoods. For caution, affected communities are defined as blocks being within 3
miles of a facility. I use 2010 decennial census data and waste flows in 2010 for the analysis because this is
the most recent demographic data available at block levels. The regression equation is:
qcj = β0 + β1%Racej + β2Incomej + β3Pricej + β4Distancecj + β5Nonlocalcj + δc + cj (2.3)
where c indicates the county origin of waste flow, and j denotes the facility destination of the flow. The
dependent variable, qcjt, is the waste amount generated by county c to be disposed at facility j in year 2010.
%Racej =
#people of the race in facility j’s community
#people in facility j’s community × 100. Incomej is median household income at community
around facility j. Pricej is average tipping fee of facility j in year 2010. Distancecj is the distance
between population centroid of county c to location of facility j. Nonlocalcj is the dummy variable that
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equals 1 if facility j is not located in county c. This dummy captures the sociopolitical control of waste flows
because waste management is a decentralized subject at local level. The county that hosts a disposal facility
manages permit registration, capacity expansion approval, and directly enact environmental ordinances on
the facility. I also consider a specification that includes market fixed effects δc. This fixed effect separates
the effects in urban areas versus rural areas. Specifically, some facilities receive a huge amount of waste
because they are within 60 miles of a big county that generates a lot of waste.
Table (2.5) reports results. Column (1) shows that waste is disproportionately sent to minority com-
munity and white community in which waste is sent most to black communities, Hispanics, and Asians,
respectively. One percentage point increase in the percentage of black in affected areas (on a mean of
3.34%) is associated with an increase in waste amount shipped from each county by 1,403 tons or 1.66% of
the average shipment size in year 2010.
After controlling for household income, the coefficients of black percentage and Hispanic percentage
become bigger and significant while the coefficient of Asian percentage becomes negative and insignificant;
see column (2). This change implies that income is negatively correlated with percent black and Hispanic
and positively correlated with percent Asian and total trash amount. The positive coefficient of income
implies that high income areas are clustered in urban region in which more trash is generated and dumped
within the region. Although trash is carted from a county to another county, it does not travel unusually far
to reach a rural area.
Columns (3) and (4) report the trash amount by race after controlling for disposal price and distance
from population center of the origin county to a destination facility. The results show that the positive signs
and significance of black percentage and Hispanic percentage coefficients persist even when controlling for
disposal price and distance. This implies that factors uniquely correlated with race are associated with the
waste coming to the facility. These factors could include housing discrimination, heterogeneous environ-
mental regulations, or differences in political power across communities. These factors create benefits for
facilities located in black and Hispanic communities, which have opposite impacts on haulers’ preferences
to the impacts of price and distance. In other words, the negative effects of price and distance on waste
amount may be offset by the positive effects of these factors, depending on which effects are dominant.
Regarding the change in coefficient magnitudes between column (2) and column (3), because we see
a negative bias in black percentage coefficient when omitting price, we can infer that price is positively
correlated with percentage of blacks, holding all the others constant. For Hispanics, the positive correlation
is much smaller. For Asians, the correlation is negative.
The change in demographic coefficients between columns (3) and (4) reveals the sign of bias when
omitting distance. Given the % black coefficient in column (4) is more positive than in (3), we can infer
that distance is positively correlated with % black, holding all the others constant. On the other hand, the
decreases in coefficients of % Hispanic and % Asian reveal a negative correlation between distance and %
Hispanic, and % Asian.
Adding the dummy variable Nonlocal in column (5) increases the coefficient of percent minority, espe-
cially the percent black. Since the dummy is negatively correlated with waste amount, the negative bias in
percent black coefficient when omitting the dummy reveals that percent black is positively correlated with
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the dummy. In other words, more trash is disposed of near black communities because of intercounty trash.
One reason is the low political influence of black communities on waste controls, which becomes evident
when the flow is not originated from local.
Column (6) shows the disparity in waste flows between minority groups and the white group disappears
after controlling market fixed effects. This implies that the disparity is an urban-rural story. Minority tends
to live in urban areas surrounding big cities and counties that generate a large amount of waste and send
waste to sites within 60 miles.
Table (2.6) reports results using intercounty and local observations separately. As seen from column
(1) in table (2.5), waste is sent more to minority communities. However, there is substantial heterogeneity
in intercounty flows and local flows. Columns (1) and (4) in table (2.6) show that the disparity in waste
disposal between Hispanic, Asian and white happens only in local flows. This confirms that waste coming
more to facilities in Asian communities than in white areas is because Asians generate a large amount of
waste and most waste is dumped locally. On the other hand, the black percentage coefficient is positive in
both samples of intercounty flows and local flows, though it is significant in only intercounty flow sample,
implying facilities in black communities receive more waste than white areas even when they are not located
in the counties that generate the most waste. Other columns report the distribution after controlling for
income, tipping fees, and transport distance. We can see that the disparity patterns persist after adding these
controls. Facilities in Asian areas receive more waste than the ones in white communities because they are
near to places of generation. Facilities in black and Hispanic communities have benefits that offset negative
effects of high prices and far distances on receiving waste.
In summary, all three minority groups tend to receive a disproportionate amount of waste. For Asians,
this effect is eliminated when we control for economic factors such as price and transport distance. For
blacks and Hispanics, the effect is even stronger after controlling for economic factors, which suggests that
either discrimination or unobserved differences matter. Hence, it is important to include facility fixed effects
when modeling the economic incentives underlying the choice of disposal facilities.
Another important result is that much of the reason why more trash ends up near black communities is
due to intercounty trash. The uneven distribution of waste flows seems to happen because they tend to live
in extended regions surrounding big counties, 60 miles within the county’s population centroid, that more
likely generate a large amount of trash. However, after controlling for market fixed effects, waste is more
likely to be sent to facilities in high percentage of black residents, among nonlocal options. Hence, policies
that reduce intercounty trash at least have the potential to distribute waste more evenly across demographic
groups. A structural model is useful to understand whether these policies would just lead to more waste
going to facilities in black communities within the county.
The structural model is also necessary because I do not observe the data had these policies, especially
NIMBY enactments, happened. Using a revealed preference approach, multinomial logit discrete choice
model, I uncover parameters underlying the economic choices of where to dump, identifying the demand
parameters of haulers for disposal facilities. I then use estimated demand parameters to quantify the change
in waste flows and distribution of waste flows under several counterfactual policy experiments that intervene
choice sets, disposal prices, and transport costs. I currently consider only the demand side, assuming 100%
44
Chapter 2 Ho (2019)
of policy burden on haulers for transparency in impact mechanisms via prices and choice sets. Understand-
ing how the supply of waste disposal sites will respond to these counterfactual policies is left for future
work.
2.4 A Model of Waste Flows
2.4.1 Demand for Disposal Facilities
Every hauler i picks up a waste amount qict in county c in quarter t. The hauler chooses a facility
j to dump the waste amount to minimize its operation costs. Equivalently, the hauler maximizes profits
conditional on a quantity of waste shipped and a payment from the county to collect waste. Let the utility of
disposing of waste at facility j be Uijct(Xijct, ijct), where Xijct are observables such as tipping fees and
transport costs (measured by the interaction between distances and fuel prices), and ijct is the unobservable
match quality between hauler i hauling from county c and facility j in quarter t. The utility of choosing
a disposal facility does not depend on waste amount qict for either of two reasons. First, picked up waste
amount is exogenous to haulers. The optimal route of collecting and carting waste to a landfill may be
predetermined before picking up the waste. Second, haulers often use the same size of trucks to travel to all
destinations. Given the observed price and distance, I specify the utility specifically as
Uijct = βXjct + ijct ≡ βppricejt + βddistancecj ∗ fuel pricet + γj + ijct (2.4)
Assume ijct follows type I extreme value distribution then the probability that facility j is chosen in trip i
is
Pijct =
exp(βXjct)∑
k∈Cct exp(βXkct)
≡ Pjct (2.5)
This model share similarities with multinomial logit discrete choice models (see McFadden (1974); Berry
(1994); Berry et al. (1995)) but has three distinct features. First, there is no outside option. A hauler must
choose a facility to dump all of their trash. The hauler does not keep trash themselves. Second, I observe
market level data. Although the model describes individual hauler behaviors, data at individual haulers are
not available. Such situation has been estimated using the method in Berry (1994); Berry et al. (1995). The
contraction mapping result in Berry (1994); Berry et al. (1995) show that there exists a unique mean utility
vector to match the model implied choice probability to observed market shares. However, this result only
applies to the case of positive market shares. In my model, zero market share can happen because a feasible
facility that is within 60 miles of the population centroid of trash-generating county may be never chosen by
any haulers in the county in a quarter. Estimation that ignores these zero shares would have bias selection.
To deal with this situation, I propose the following maximum likelihood estimation. This approach assumes
no heterogeneity in the choice probability of hauler/trip i, and in the waste amount of a trip, within a market.
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2.4.2 Model Likelihood
The probability that hauler i chooses the facility j that he was actually observed to choose is
f(Yict;β) =
J∏
j=1
P
yijct
ijct (2.6)
where yijct = 1 if hauler i chose j and zero otherwise (in market ct). The log likelihood function of the
model is
L(β) =
∑
c,t
∑
i
∑
j
yijct logPjct (2.7)
L(β) =
∑
c,t
∑
j
logPjct
∑
i
yijct (2.8)
Assume picked-up waste amounts within a market at a time have the same size, i.e. qict = qct, then the
market share of a county’s waste that is dumped at facility j is
sjct ≡
∑
i qictyijct
Qct
=
qct
∑
i yijct
Qct
(2.9)
where Qct is the total waste generated by households in county c at time t. Then log likelihood becomes
L(β) =
∑
c,t
∑
j
logPjct · sjct ·Qct/qct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nct
(2.10)
It should notice that Qct/qct is the number of haulers Nct in a market c at a time t. Now, there are two
maximum likelihood estimators, depending on the assumptions we believe.
The first estimator assumes that the number of haulers across different markets is the same. This implies
that market sizes differ because the picked-up waste amounts vary across markets. The log likelihood
function is
L(β) =
1
N
∑
c,t
∑
j
logPjct · sjct (2.11)
The second estimator assumes that the picked-up waste amounts across different markets have the same
size. This means that the trash collection trucks have the same size in the whole California. The log
likelihood function becomes
L(β) =
1
q
∑
c,t
∑
j
logPjct · sjct ·Qct (2.12)
The second estimator implies that market sizes differ across markets because the number of collection
trips and the number of haulers vary across markets. Given this situation is more plausible, the main model
will be estimated using the log likelihood function (2.12). I cannot identify the truck size, but I can identify
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the haulers’ preference parameters.
2.4.3 Identification
I exploit cross-sectional and time-series variation in the data to identify the parameters. These rich vari-
ations allow me to control for facility fixed effects, which is important for two reasons. First, we have seen
that after controlling for income, tipping fees, and distances, factors that are correlated with demographics
of the residents living near the disposal facilities also matter in haulers’ decisions. Hence, facility fixed ef-
fects capture the heterogeneous influences of the demographics of communities living nearby facilities and
time-invariant characteristics that are correlated with these demographics. Second, I can alleviate the price
endogeneity problem due to omitted variable bias. Facilities that have good quality in the sense that they
have low hassle costs, high acceptance rates, or operation hour flexibility, etc. tend to have high disposal
prices. Excluding the good quality control in the estimation would cause the price coefficient estimate to
have upward bias.
However, the difficulty in estimating price coefficient consistently is to overcome bias due to measure-
ment error. This is because I observe listed prices instead of contracted prices. Hence, to overcome both
endogeneity and measurement error, I use sum of total waste in the other markets that include the facility in
their choice sets (excluding the instrumented market). This is different from the literature where exogenous
cost shifters, BLP instruments, Hausman instruments, Nevo instruments are used; see Berry et al. (1995);
Hausman (1996); Nevo (2001).
On the one hand, the market-size instrument is correlated with price because the facility is setting one
common listed price for all markets.8 On the other hand, this instrument is exogenous with the demand
in the instrumented market because it excludes demand factors of the instrumented market. Even though
market sizes of the other markets may be correlated with the waste amount in the instrumented market via
common geographical shocks such as growth of state economy, they do not affect the individual hauler’s
choices in the instrumented market.
To estimate price coefficients from exogenous variation in price using instrument in a nonlinear model, I
apply control function approach. Following the literature, control function is estimated using polynomial of
residuals obtained from the first stage in which price is regressed on exogenous variables and instruments.
In the main model, the polynomial terms enter as extra explanatory variables; see Petrin and Train (2010). I
estimate models with linear polynomial and quadratic polynomial of control terms.
The transport cost parameter is identified in part based on how waste flows vary by distance between the
population center of a county and a disposal facility, and in part based on how these variations increase and
decrease over time with diesel prices.
2.4.4 Model Results
Table (2.7) reports results of the model. Column (1), (2), and (3) show the estimates of facility fixed
effect, linear control function, and quadratic control function specifications, respectively. As expected, the
8Due to Commerce Clause, facilities are not allowed to discriminate waste based on waste origin.
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facility fixed effects specification does not resolve all bias in price coefficient estimate. Although its estimate
of price coefficient has the correct sign, it is extremely small and statistically insignificant, and the resulted
price elasticity is −0.03. Using market sizes of the other relevant markets to instrument price, the upward
bias is mitigated. The magnitude of price coefficient becomes two order of magnitude bigger; price elasticity
is −4.20. The positive sign of the first coefficient of control function confirms the upward bias is corrected.
The transport cost measured by the interaction between distance and diesel price is robustly estimated
in all specification. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant, implying a distance elasticity of
−1.59.
The ratio between transport cost coefficient and price coefficient captures hauler’s willingness to pay for
proximity to the disposal facility. This is the cost of transportation. The estimates imply that transportation
costs $0.43 per ton-mile given diesel prices at the 2000 level ($1.672/gal). This agrees with the estimates
from several publications. First, Miller and Osborne (2014) report the transportation costs $0.46 per ton mile
for shipping cement. Second, the 20th edition of Transportation in American (2007) reports that revenues
per ton mile for Class I general freight common carriers (basic truck transport) ranged from roughly $0.29–
$0.35 over 1983–2003. Third, previous studies in waste transportation in 1990 and 1992 report transport
costs from $0.16 to $0.36 per ton mile; see Fischer et al. (1993).
2.4.5 Model Fit
Figure (2.4) shows the scatter plots and correlation coefficients between observed values and predicted
values of key variables. The key variables I consider are waste flows, waste-weighted average distance, and
waste-weighted average price because it is important to match waste movements well to study the spatial and
demographic distribution of waste flows. I also especially consider the goodness of fit in year 2010 because
my analysis focuses on demographic distribution in 2010. Overall, the model successfully replicates the
waste flows, waste-weighted average distance, and waste-weighted average price, especially in year 2010.
2.4.6 Sensitivity Checks
In this section, I discuss the robustness of the baseline results to different estimators of the model.
Instead of using the market-weighted estimator that maximizes objective function (2.12), we can use the
unweighted estimator (2.11). This estimator aims to maximize goodness of fit in all markets equally, instead
of emphasizing the fit in the big markets as does the estimator in (2.12).
Table (2.8) reports results. When weighting all markets equally, price coefficients becomes bigger while
transport cost coefficient is similar to the case of market-weighted estimates. This reveals that big markets
are less responsive to price.
2.5 Counterfactual Policies
Given the underlying primitives of the structural model (demand for waste disposal), I conduct sev-
eral counterfactual policy experiments to evaluate the implications on spatial distribution (intercounty trash
flows), hauler surplus, and demographic distribution of waste. Specifically, taking as given the baseline
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parameter estimates and the topology of the industry in year 2010, I compute the haulers’ optimal choices
of where to dump waste under policy interventions to examine the change in waste flows between a policy
scenario and the baseline (the prediction in the absence of policy interventions).
I consider four counterfactual policies: import bans that outlaw intercounty waste flows, import taxes
that tax waste flows that cross county lines, fuel taxes that tax diesel prices at a percent rate, and universal
trash taxes that tax all trash disposal at an equal rate. These are environmental protection policies that aim
to reduce intercounty waste flows but they intervene economics choices of haulers by affecting haulers’
choice sets, tipping fees, and transport cost. It is, hence, important to use a structural model that accounts
for hauler’s choice sets, tipping fees, transport costs, and facility quality to explore the effectiveness of
these policies. Furthermore, as shown in section (2.3.3), waste that is sent to nonlocal facilities is likely to
end up near black communities. Policies that aim to restrict intercounty trash would have the potential to
distribute waste more evenly across demographic groups, but the structural model is useful to understand
whether these policies would just lead to more waste going to facilities in black communities within the
waste generation county.
In this section, I begin with the analysis on the change in intercounty waste flows and the economic im-
pacts of the counterfactual policies. I then consider the implications of policies on demographic distribution
of waste disposal.
2.5.1 Intercounty Waste Transport and Economic Impacts
Panel A in table (2.9) shows the effects of the four policies on intercounty waste transport (exports)
and the economic impacts on hauler surplus of an average county market, compared to the baseline level
(prediction in the absence of policies). There are two baseline levels, one is used to quantify the effects of
import bans, and the other one is used for the comparison with import taxes, fuel taxes, and waste taxes. The
reason why there are two baseline levels is that a few counties do not have any disposal facilities within their
border lines, namely, Alpine, Amador, Del Norte, Nevada, San Francisco, and Tuolumne. I exclude those
counties in calculating the change in economic factors and demographic distribution of waste flows for the
import ban scenario (columns (1) and (2)).
Because an import ban that interdicts intercounty waste transport would restrict the choice set of a
hauler in a waste generating county to only facilities within the county border line (local options), the
policy would reduce exports by 100%. Specifically, the amount is about 570,000 tons in an average market
(trash generating county) for year 2010 (row 1 in column 2). The distance to transport trash would also
decrease unless most of trash is generated near the county border line rather than the county center. This
is demonstrated by a reduction by 10,300 kiloton-mile in trash mileage, or equivalently around 3 miles in
transporting trash from population center of generating county to a disposal facility.
Theoretically, the change in total tipping fees the hauler pays for disposal after an import ban is am-
biguous because the model explains the hauler choice using three factors, price, transport cost, and facility
fixed effects. If the hauler chooses to dispose of trash at a nonlocal facility for cheaper prices despite distant
travel, they would pay higher tipping fees for being forced to dispose of trash at local facilities. On the other
hand, the hauler may choose a nonlocal facility for good quality despite high tipping fees. In this case, the
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import ban would result in a decrease in tipping fees. Column (2) reveals that the overall effect of import
bans on tipping fees is dominated by the second mechanism. Particularly, total tipping fees decrease by
about $750,000, or 12 cents per ton after imposing import bans. Although haulers would save on tipping
fees and transport costs after the import bans, their surplus reduces by 4 million dollars, or equivalently
$1.25 per ton for forgoing good quality facilities outside the generating county borders.
An import tax would make disposal facilities outside the generating county borders (nonlocal facilities)
become more expensive relative to local alternatives. As a result, the tax would reduce intercounty waste
flows. Column (5) shows that a tax at 15% would reduce about 300,000 tons of exports, which is 55% of
the current exports. Total tipping fees would increase by nearly $900,000, or 34 cents per ton because both
options of switching to local facilities and staying at nonlocal facilities are more expensive than the current
choice. Trash mileage falls by 5,500 kiloton-mile, or 1.6 miles for a transport journey from a population
center of generating county to a disposal facility. Hauler surplus decreases by 2 million dollars, or 87 cents
per ton.
The third policy I consider is a fuel tax that taxes diesel prices at a percent rate and hence, makes the
trash transport more expensive. As a result, waste would be carted to nearer facilities, resulting in a reduction
in trash travel mileage. Column (7) shows that a fuel tax at 15% would reduce nearly 5,000 kiloton-miles
in trash mileage, or equivalently 1.35 miles in a journey from population center of generating county to a
disposal facility. Because out-of-county facilities are generally farther from where waste is generated than
local alternatives, the fuel tax would also reduce exports. At the tax of 15%, exports would fall by 116,000
tons, which is 20% of the baseline level.
The change in total tipping fees in the case of fuel tax is theoretically ambiguous because of two opposite
directions. First, switching to a nearer facility is costly because the nearer facility is expensive, which is the
reason the hauler did not opt for. Second, switching to a nearer facility would save the hauler on paying
tipping fees because the nearer facility is cheap. The reason why the hauler did not opt for this cheap
nearer facility is that it did not offer other benefits rather than tipping fees and transport costs, such as high
acceptance rates, operation hours, capacity, etc., which are captured by facility fixed effects in my model.
Row 2 in columns (6) and (7) reveals that the second effect is dominant. Overall haulers in a market would
save 1.5 million dollars (a reduction by 1.11%) in paying tipping fees, or 21 cents per ton, after a fuel tax of
15%. However, forgoing good quality facilities would cost haulers 8 million dollars, or equivalently $2.11
per ton.
The final policy of interest is a universal waste tax that taxes all trash disposal at an equal rate. This
tax is motivated by the scenario where everyone wants to protect themselves and justifies the tax as a mean
to compensate for communities nearby trash sites. At an equal percent rate, the waste tax would penalize
expensive facilities more than less expensive facilities. The policy impact on interstate trash transport is
theoretically ambiguous because of two opposite directions. First, if haulers cart trash to out-of-county
options because of cheap tipping fees, the waste tax would exacerbate intercounty trash flows. Second, if
out-of-county facilities are expensive but haulers opt for them for reasons other than prices and distances,
the waste tax would mitigate intercounty trash transport. Columns (8) and (9) show that the second effect
is dominant: Exports fall by 20,000 tons (3.45%) at the waste tax of 15%. Total tipping fees haulers in
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a market have to pay disposal facilities increase 14 million dollars (10.21%), or $4.45 per ton because of
the tax. Trash mileage decreases slightly by 2.78%, or 0.29 miles for a trip, revealing that switching to
less expensive facilities do not necessarily mean higher cost of transportation. Hauler surplus falls by 20.9
million dollars, or $5.94 per ton due to the waste tax of 15%. Overall, the result of the waste tax effects is also
consistent with the results of the other three policies in which they imply haulers generally benefit greatly
from factors that are uniquely associated with the facility besides disposal prices and transport distance.
2.5.2 Demographic Distribution of Waste Flows
Panel B in table (2.9) shows the effects of the four policies on the demographic distribution of waste
disposal. Specifically, the panel computes the percent trash in a market that ends up at disposal facilities
by race and ethnicity of affected communities for the baseline estimates (before counterfactuals) and the
percentage point change after polices. For example, assuming that trash from a generating market c that
is sent to disposal facility j affects all people living three miles of the facility location equally, the percent
trash of the market c exposes on white community is
% trash to white =
∑
j∈Jc qcj × Number of whites in j’s 3-mile bufferj
Total population in j’s 3-mile bufferj
· 1∑
j∈Jc qcj
× 100 (2.13)
Reports in panel B are average county level after weighting these exposure percentages by market size (total
trash generated in the origin county). The baseline level to compare the effects of import ban is column (1)
and the baseline to compare the other policies is column (3). This separation arises because several counties
do not have any disposal facilities within their borders.
As seen in section (2.3.3), among facilities that are out of generating-county borders, trash is more likely
to end up at facilities near black communities. Policies that reduce intercounty waste flows would have the
potential to reduce waste that is sent to black communities. However, that would not happen if trash is
redirected to local facilities near black communities. In fact, section (2.3.3) shows that among local options
(facilities within trash-generating county borders), trash is also more likely to end up at the ones near black
communities. Therefore, it is important to explore which effect is dominant. Is a reduction in intercounty
trash exported to facilities near black communities bigger than the increase in trash that would be redirected
to local facilities near black communities? Another concern is that whether a reduction in trash that is sent
to black communities happens at the expense of an increase in trash that is sent to other minority groups.
Column (2) shows that after the ban on intercounty waste transport, the percent waste that is sent to
Blacks and Asians would fall because of dominant falls in exports to Blacks and Asians. However, the
percent waste that is sent to Hispanics would enlarge because the increase in trash that is sent to local
facilities near Hispanic communities offsets the fall in exports to nonlocal facilities near Hispanic areas.
In contrast to the import ban, an import tax would result in an increase in percent waste, see columns (4)
and (5). A reason is that an import tax tries to reduce intercounty waste flows by intervening the disposal
price rather than restricting the choice set of haulers to only local facilities. Under the import tax, a hauler
may switch from nonlocal black facilities (facilities that are in high percent black communities) to either
other nonlocal black facilities that are relatively cheaper or local black facilities. The fact that percent exports
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to black facilities decrease while total percent trash to black facilities increase implies that switching to local
black facilities happens more strongly than switching to nonlocal black facilities.
Columns (6) and (7) show that fuel taxes at 5% and 15% would nearly not change the percent trash that
is sent to black communities although they would reduce the exports to black communities. This implies
that a hauler would highly likely switch to local black facilities after giving up on nonlocal black facilities
that would become costly in transportation after the fuel tax. In fact, the percent trash that is sent to all
minority groups increases while the percent trash that is sent to white communities decreases after the fuel
tax. This reveals that overall facilities in minority communities are nearer to population weighted centroid
of trash generating county than the facilities in white communities.
Column (8) and (9) show that the waste tax would overall decrease the percent trash that is sent to all race
groups except Hispanics. This reveals that facilities in Hispanic communities may have cheap tipping fees,
since the tax would make expensive facilities much more expensive than less expensive facilities. Another
noticeable point is that exports do not fall uniformly in all race groups. Exports to black and exports to
Hispanics in fact increase. Although the increase in exports to Hispanic communities can be explained by
that facilities in Hispanic communities are less expensive, the increase in exports to black communities may
not generally be accounted by disposal price factor. The reason is that if facilities in black communities are
generally cheap, they would receive more trash after the tax overall, which contradicts with the finding in
columns (8) and (9). Hence, the negative sign in change in percent trash to Blacks and the positive sign in
change in percent exports to Blacks imply that facilities in black communities may have additional benefits
rather than disposal price and that are associated with nonlocal flows. For example, black communities may
have low political influence at county level to resist intercounty trash flows.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper documents the disproportionate distribution of waste disposal by race and ethnicity. Although
there are not many people who live near (three miles) a trash site, there is a strong disparity between the
amount of trash that is sent to facilities in highly present minority groups and that is sent to facilities in
predominantly white communities. Furthermore, intercounty trash is highly likely to end up at facilities in
black communities, suggesting NIMBY policies may induce a more equitable distribution of waste. How-
ever, since waste flows are the result of several economic factors such as tipping fees, transport costs, and
facility quality, a structural model is useful to assess the effects of these policies.
Using a structural model to estimate the demand for waste disposal, I find that policies that limit in-
terjurisdictional waste flows would not generally lead to a more equitable distribution of trash. Making
intercounty waste transport costlier by taxing gasoline prices, taxing out-of-county waste, or even banning
interjurisdictional flows would generally not reduce waste that is sent to facilities near black residents. The
reason is that haulers may switch from out-of-county facilities to other out-of-county facilities or within-
waste-generating-county facilities near black communities. Additionally, the policies tend to substitute
waste away from facilities near white residents toward facilities near Hispanic residents because the facili-
ties in Hispanic communities are cheap and close to the population center of the waste-generating county.
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This paper is the first study that explores the demographic distribution of solid waste flows and how
environmental protection policies affect the waste flows, taking into account of market factors of hauling
decisions. However, several extensions are useful. First, I have not examined deeply the reasons underlying
the inequitable distribution of waste flows. Do minority communities generate fewer but receive more waste
than white communities? What else in addition to tipping fees and transport distance that could explain the
waste flows that go to minority communities? Is it because the minorities have lower political capability?
Is it because the minorities come to nuisance for low housing costs and high-income opportunity in waste
disposal industry? Is it because the minorities seek to live in urban areas that generate a massive amount of
trash and dump trash within these extended urban areas (i.e. waste cannot be hauled too far due to expensive
transport costs)?
A second extension is to consider the equilibrium effects. Adding the supply side to the structural model
is useful to account for the fact that disposal facilities may change their prices upon a counterfactual policy.
This relaxes the current assumption that haulers bear the full costs of policies. Additionally, it is also useful
to distinguish the competition behaviors between private facilities and public facilities to consider the effects
of another class of waste flow controls.
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FIGURE 2.1: Overview of solid waste disposal in California from Jan 1995 to Dec 2015
(A) Number of disposal facilities
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(B) (Waste weighted) average disposal price (in 2000 dollars)
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(D) Total waste amount generated by the average county
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(E) Percentage of waste the average county sends to other
counties
10
15
20
25
30
35
40%
19
95
q3
19
97
q3
19
99
q3
20
01
q3
20
03
q3
20
05
q3
20
07
q3
20
09
q3
20
11
q3
20
13
q3
20
15
q3
(F) Percentage of waste that travels beyond a given distance
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
%
 o
ut
sid
e 
tra
sh
10 30 40 50 60 100 150
Distance (miles)
Note: The graph shows several features in California waste disposal industry over time. Distance is driving distance from population
weighted coordinate of origin county to destination facility. Figure (2.1f) shows the percentage of waste that is transported farther
than a given distance from origin county in a recent year, 2015.
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FIGURE 2.2: Price response and distance response by distance
(A) Distance response at different knots of distance using
analysis of waste flows within 120 miles
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(B) Price response at different knots of distance using analy-
sis of waste flows within 120 miles
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(C) Distance response at different knots of distance using
analysis of waste flows within 150 miles
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(D) Price response at different knots of distance using analy-
sis of waste flows within 150 miles
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Note: Figure shows the coefficients on distance and price at different knots of distance (linear splines) from the quarter by origin
county fixed effect regression, where dependent variable is trash amount from a county to a facility. Figures (2.2a) and (2.2b) use
the sample of all combinations of flows by a county and a facility within 120 miles. Figures (2.2c) and (2.2d) use the sample of
flows within 150 miles. 95% confidence intervals are displayed with the point estimates. Standard errors are clustered by origin
county.
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FIGURE 2.3: Illustrate sizes of choice sets
(A) Choice set of San Francisco market
(B) Choice set of Los Angeles market
Note: The graph shows how wide 60-mile and 80-mile markets are from the population center of San Francisco and Los Angeles.
Black dots represent population center coordinates of counties. Counties are blue colorized by out-of-county exports of waste.
Facilities are red colorized by total waste amount.
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FIGURE 2.4: Model fit
(A) Correlation between observed waste flows and predicted
flows (= 0.8965)
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(B) Correlation between observed waste flows and predicted
flows in 2010 (= 0.9128)
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(C) Correlation between observed distance and predicted dis-
tance (= 0.8175)
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(D) Correlation between observed distance and predicted dis-
tance in 2010 (= 0.9205)
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(E) Correlation between observed price and predicted price
(= 0.9268)
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(F) Correlation between observed price and predicted price
in 2010 (= 0.9712)
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Note: The graph shows the correlation coefficient between observed values and predicted (model implied) values of key variables.
Panels (2.4a) and (2.4b) show the correlation in trash flows (trash amount generated from a county to a facility in a quarter). Panels
(2.4c) and (2.4d) show the correlation in (waste weighted) average distance shipped by a county in a quarter. Panels (2.4e) and
(2.4f) show the correlation in (waste weighted) average tipping fee by a county in a quarter. Panels (2.4b), (2.4d), and (2.4f) show
the correlation for observations in year 2010.
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TABLE 2.2: Summary statistics of panels of waste flows
count mean sd min max
Panel A: Flows characteristics (unit: quarter × origin county × destination facility)
A1: Flows within 60 miles of the population-weighted centroid of a county
quantity (ton) 36,186 21,453.27 70,161.38 0 1,063,515
distance (mile) 36,186 37.12 14.91 1.737 59.93
waste-weighted distance (mile) 36,186 23.52 12.90 1.73 59.93
waste-weighted price ($/ton) 36,186 36.40 12.10 1.50 181.00
A2: All positive flows in California, including shipments beyond 60 miles
quantity (ton) 53,957 15,401.27 58,388.94 .01 1,063,515
waste-weighted distance (mile) 53,957 28.00 23.23 1.73 700.17
waste-weighted price ($/ton) 53,957 36.49 12.18 1.50 181.00
Panel B: Choice set characteristics (unit: quarter × origin county)
B1: Within 60 miles
market size (ton) 4,431 175,199.3 416,191 1.6 3,573,185
out-of-county exports (%) 4,431 21.68 33.34 0 100
number of options 4,431 8.17 5.24 1 30
B2: All choices in California
market size (ton) 4,788 173,560.3 426,099.1 .37 3,881,458
out-of-county exports (%) 4,788 31.62 38.05 0 100
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics of the sample of trash flows, i.e. the unit of observation is quarter × origin county ×
destination facility. Panel A1 includes all waste flow pairs between an origin county and a destination facility in a quarter (36,186
observations) within 60 miles, of which there are 24,473 observations of positive waste flows. Panel A2 include only positive waste
flows, but it covers all flows in California. Panel B1 shows summary characteristics of key indicators from the perspective of haulers
in a market: total waste generated by a county (market size), the percentage of waste in the county that is exported to other counties
(out-of-county exports), and the number of disposal facilities within 60 miles from population centroid of the county (number of
options). Panel B2 is similar to panel B1, but covering all choices in California (including choices resulted from the waste flows
beyond 60 miles).
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TABLE 2.3: Descriptive analysis of the number of people who live near a trash site
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the affected communities by distance
3-mile buffer 7-mile buffer 15-mile buffer
mean sd mean sd mean sd
% affected white 3.26 6.36 16.41 15.69 57.47 44.35
% affected black 3.69 8.33 17.47 18.42 79.10 54.58
% affected Asian 3.50 6.40 18.11 19.42 61.94 56.28
% affected Hispanic 3.95 8.62 18.19 19.05 61.99 51.33
Panel B: Descriptive regression of the 3-mile affected communities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% white % Asian % black %HHispanic
Constant 4.2310∗∗∗ 3.9226∗∗ 6.1367∗∗ 7.8969∗∗∗
(1.5182) (1.6554) (2.4411) (2.2397)
trash (mil tons) -2.3781∗∗∗ -2.0630∗∗ -2.1132∗∗ -1.7931∗
(0.8737) (0.8432) (0.9835) (0.9259)
median hh income($1000s) -0.0046 0.0041 -0.0345 -0.0651∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0285) (0.0369) (0.0296)
year 2010 2010 2010 2010
SE robust robust robust robust
Observations 103 103 103 103
R2 0.035 0.022 0.030 0.046
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.003 0.011 0.027
Note: Panel A shows summary statistics of the population who live near a trash site, relative to the hosting-county population, in
2010. % affected white is the percentage of white in the destination county who live near a trash site by a certain distance. Panel B
reports how the affected population by race responds to trash amount in a nearby trash site. Dependent variable is Affected Levelj =
#people of the race in a facility’s 3-mile bufferj
#people of the race in a facility’s countyj
× 100. Separate regressions are done for different race groups. Significant level: * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE 2.4: Summary statistics of demographics at waste generating county vs. receiving community
3-mile buffer receiving county generating county California
unweighted weighted unweighted weighted unweighted weighted level
population 25,938 36,085 1,689,346 3,550,303 724,375 1,278,399 37,253,956
(43,949) (40,852) (2,808,017) (3,539,681) (1,493,933) (1,649,397)
white 8,359 11,339 569,291 1,181,551 288,631 520,299 14,956,253
(12,600) (11,466) (794,328) (946,047) (468,834) (550,838)
black 1,027 1,416 116,516 248,290 42,373 76,759 2,163,804
(2,256) (2,515) (236,562) (313,591) (119,996) (129,642)
Asian 3,632 5,650 227,325 481,614 93,529 145,612 4,775,070
(7,425) (7,269) (397,684) (490,828) (218,980) (218,819)
Hispanic 12,095 16,596 723,394 1,530,798 273,970 489,225 14,013,719
(31,336) (28,459) (1,343,598) (1,753,682) (686,709) (762,695)
% white 49.36 44.09 45.79 39.74 54.58 50.45 40.15
(24.71) (20.85) (17.73) (10.82) (19.11) (17.38)
% black 2.73 3.73 4.26 5.80 3.31 4.27 5.81
(3.62) (3.92) (3.52) (3.42) (3.28) (2.93)
% Asian 8.11 13.01 8.74 12.67 7.06 9.76 12.82
(11.98) (12.02) (8.31) (6.90) (7.86) (8.28)
% Hispanic 35.33 35.72 37.29 38.21 30.46 31.51 37.62
(25.53) (22.32) (17.03) (11.19) (17.36) (15.03)
median hh 66,071 82,062 45,670 49,402 45,187 49,711 48,072
income (25,672) (23,769) (10,216) (8,622) (10,290) (10,430)
Note: This table shows summary statistics of population in waste receiving communities versus waste generating communities.
Receiving communities are presented as receiving counties and nearby communities. A nearby community is defined by a 3-mile
radius circle centering a trash site. Population counts for the nearby community are aggregated from 2010 census blocks that
have their centroid location in the buffer. Median household income at a block is the one at its block group. The table contrasts
unweighted average population level and average level weighted by waste amount.
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TABLE 2.5: Current distribution of trash amount in 3-miles buffers of facilities
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable 84,670 trash amount
% black 3.34 1402.55 2786.28 2970.09 3656.90 5449.69∗∗ -304.40
(2813.79) (2585.56) (2532.57) (2592.00) (2516.99) (2703.09)
% Hispanic 31.19 938.00∗ 1655.71∗∗ 1658.58∗∗ 1491.80∗∗ 1530.31∗∗ -664.06
(537.69) (688.77) (698.18) (657.44) (627.68) (899.49)
% Asian 11.90 813.77 -484.77 -580.37 -621.28 66.95 291.81
(1423.25) (946.81) (906.37) (884.99) (894.26) (795.92)
Income ($1000s) 58 2431.24∗∗ 2754.58∗∗ 2894.23∗∗∗ 3388.77∗∗∗
(947.02) (1037.10) (793.65) (785.58)
price 40 -695.14 -624.28 -467.85 767.64
(590.44) (597.05) (549.72) (622.14)
distance 37.46 -13429.67∗∗∗ 2032.35 -9858.36∗∗
(3673.98) (5193.87) (3960.69)
distance2 122.56∗∗ -13.66 80.89
(47.02) (61.89) (50.23)
nonlocal -289332.09∗∗∗
(62571.33)
Origin county FE Yes
N 374 374 374 374 374 374
adj. R2 0.000 0.022 0.021 0.116 0.222 0.272
Note: This table shows the descriptive regression of the demographic distribution of waste flows. Dependent variable is waste flow
between an origin county and destination facility in the county’s choice set. %Racej and Incomej (median household income) are
characteristics of community within 3 miles of facility j. Variables are valued at 2010 level. Separate regressions for intercounty
flows and local flows are reported in table (2.6) below. Standard errors are clustered by destination county. Significant level: *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
TABLE 2.6: Current distribution of trash amount in 3-miles buffers of facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable trash amount
% black 2784.67∗∗ 3158.62∗∗ 3158.16∗∗∗ 2726.16∗∗ 3290.20 7249.75 8652.08 1371.83
(1169.66) (1196.26) (1153.32) (1290.95) (8200.04) (6733.23) (6527.18) (16019.96)
% Hispanic -55.15 129.21 164.44 -155.46 1961.94 3911.98∗∗ 3864.77∗∗ 3900.19
(148.84) (141.89) (162.64) (326.45) (1347.19) (1752.04) (1669.79) (3104.09)
% Asian -232.89 -493.18∗ -565.25∗ -664.82 9791.87 3021.92 3729.59 13036.64∗
(236.13) (276.54) (315.82) (442.83) (7515.70) (5617.49) (6085.63) (7310.12)
Income ($1000s) 568.25 819.60 573.37 8779.82∗∗∗ 8863.31∗∗∗ 10104.08∗
(347.39) (508.23) (360.45) (2053.77) (1754.81) (5277.10)
price -313.26 -318.76 -128.24 7556.67
(278.08) (290.18) (1837.88) (6660.30)
distance -7635.41 -7376.11∗ 8991.65 15435.74
(4772.16) (4229.79) (9407.97) (23005.03)
distance2 95.26 86.93 -102.34 -213.40
(62.00) (53.81) (151.64) (423.23)
observations intercounty intercounty intercounty intercounty local local local local
Origin county FE Yes Yes
N 273 273 273 273 101 101 101 101
adj. R2 0.007 0.016 0.026 0.215 0.052 0.163 0.148 0.122
Note: This table reports the demographic distribution of waste flows for two different samples, intercounty flows and local flows.
Dependent variable is waste flow between an origin county and destination facility in the county’s choice set. %Racej and
Incomej (median household income) are characteristics of community within 3 miles of facility j. Variables are valued at 2010
level. Stacked regression using all observations is reported in the previous table (2.5). Standard errors are clustered by destination
county. Significant level: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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TABLE 2.7: Results from logit demand, baseline model, using market-size-weighted estimator
(1) (2) (3)
Model Facility IV IV
fixed effects linear control function quadratic control function
price −0.0011 −0.1592*** −0.1593***
(0.0016) (0.0238) (0.0238)
distance∗fuel −0.0442*** −0.0412*** −0.0411***
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
control term 15.9038e−2*** 15.9199e−2***
(0.0240) (0.0241)
control term2 −0.2507e−4
(0.4580e−4)
facility FE Y Y Y
First stage results price
total market sizes (hundred thousand tons) −0.2205***
(0.0108)
1(serve at least 2 markets) −2.9998***
(0.9919)
distance∗fuel 0.0200***
(0.0013)
1st stage R2 0.6685
F test 212.62
price elasticity −0.0277 −4.1983 −4.2007
transport elasticity −1.7138 −1.5945 −1.5943
Note: Specification (1) is facility fixed effect model. Specifications (2) and (3) use sum of other relevant market sizes as an
instrument and control function approach with linear and quadratic forms, respectively. Specifically, price value of an observation
cjt is instrumented by the sum of market sizes of other relevant market M−c,jt. A market is relevant if that is not the instrumented
market c but it contains facility j in its choice set. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Price elasticities are the average over all
observations. All specifications include facility fixed effects. Significant level: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
TABLE 2.8: Results from logit demand using market-equally-weighted estimator
(1) (2) (3)
Model Facility IV IV
fixed effects linear control function quadratic control function
price −0.0014 −0.3167*** −0.3183***
(0.0014) (0.0369) (0.0376)
distance∗fuel −0.0539 −0.0476*** −0.0477***
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011)
control term 0.3157*** 31.5187e−2***
(0.0370) (0.0378)
control term2 −0.1605e−4
(0.3207e−4)
facility FE Y Y Y
price elasticity -0.0370 -8.1787 -8.2218
transport elasticity -2.0693 -1.8295 -1.8279
Note: Specification (1) is facility fixed effect model. Specifications (2) and (3) use sum of other relevant market sizes as an
instrument and control function approach with linear and quadratic forms, respectively. Standard errors are bootstrapped. Price
elasticities are the average over all observations. All specifications include facility fixed effects. Significant level: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3
Residential Sorting: Evidence from
Openings and Closings of Municipal Solid
Waste Facilities in California
Forming sound environmental justice policy involves understanding whether the correlation between
race and environmental bads results from the disproportionate siting of locally unwanted land uses or
nuisance-driven residential mobility. This paper presents evidence of residential sorting using a difference-
in-difference strategy. Specifically, I compare changes in population after an opening (and closing) of a
trash site between blocks within one mile to faraway blocks. Results show a 11 percent decrease in white
population and a 44 percent increase in Hispanic population in a block after a trash site opened within one
mile. Closing the site does not change white population immediately while inducing a 11 percent fall in
Hispanic population, relative to the period during which the site was operating.
3.1 Introduction
Environmental justice (EJ) has long been considered important in the agenda of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency since the 1994 Executive Order of President Bill Clinton.1 Evidences of environmen-
tal injustice are first formally shown by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1983) and United Church
of Christ’s Commission on Racial Justice (1987) (UCC). They report the disproportionate distribution of
facilities for treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste (TSDFs) among demographic groups by
race/ethnicity, and income.2 Two decades later, the revised report by UCC (Bullard et al., 2007) showed
that the disparity is still an issue: African American and Hispanic residents occupied 43.7% of residents
within one kilometer (0.6 mile) of a hazardous waste facility, while just 19% outside of a 5-km buffer.
Given the persistence of the disparity, researchers have continued to unravel the explanations for the cor-
relations between race, ethnicity, and hazards. Some studies argue that environmental inequality emerges
1See the details of the EPA’s “Plan EJ 2020” at www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/about-ej-2020
2UCC reported the percentage minority population in zip code areas with an operating hazardous waste facility, on average, was
twice as great as in areas that did not contain a site.
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because environmental hazards are disproportionately sited in minority neighborhoods. Others show that
environmental injustice may develop and persist, since minority residents are more likely to move into ar-
eas containing hazards. Such evidence of residential mobility is important, because it suggests that some
EJ policies (e.g. Superfund remediation) may not help the households that were originally exposed to the
environmental hazards, but instead benefit the richer households that migrate into the area (Sieg et al., 2004).
This paper tests the residential sorting hypothesis using a panel data of block-level demographics. Using
a difference-in-difference model, I identify the impact of entry and exit of municipal solid waste (MSW)
facilities on population of each demographic groups in affected communities. Specifically, I compare the
population change after an opening/closing of the site between affected blocks that contain a facility within
one mile and faraway blocks, after controlling for time-invariant characteristics of blocks and year fixed
effects. The identification assumption is that the demographic trends between blocks within a block group
are likely to be similar apart from their proximity to an entry (or exit).
I find evidence of migration correlated with openings and closings of MSW facilities at a block. Opening
leads to white exit of about 11 percent and Hispanic move-ins of 44 percent. Closing the site would not
induce white mobility but a significant fall of 11 percent in Hispanic population, relative to the operating
period. In fact, relative to the period before the site were opened, closing induces white exit of about 13
percent and Hispanic move-ins of 32 percent.
There are several factors that contribute to the migration resulted from openings and closings of waste
facilities. The first is green preference or willingness to avoid pollution of residents in the neighborhoods of
facilities. The second is job preference. Economic activities of MSW facilities may create job opportunities.
With a weak green preference, one may prefer to move in the MSW neighborhood because of a job offer.
The third is credit constraints. Closing an MSW facility may gentrify its neighborhood, resulting an increase
in housing values. This will induce out-migration of people who have credit constraints and cannot afford
high costs of living.
While this paper does not disentangle the effects of those above channels, it presents evidence of their
effects. Specifically, I show that closing an MSW facility does not gentrify its neighborhood toward white
taste but destroy job opportunities for Hispanic residents. I exploit the closing events that resulted from
the 1992 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to decompose the effect of closings into the
effect of closings started in 1992–1996 and the effect of closings that began after 1996. The results show
that closures of MSW facilities under the 1992 RCRA resulted in much higher white exit than post-1997
closures. The reason is because the closed sites during 1992–1996 were heavily polluted. Closures of MSW
facilities under 1992 RCRA did not receive any special treatment, contrasting to sites under the Superfund
program that received special cleanup. MSW facilities were forced to close because they did not meet new
environmental regulations, such as requirements to install methane and water monitoring. On the other hand,
post-1997 closures, which resulted from the downturns in the operation of a facility, led to a larger job loss,
resulting in significant move-outs of Hispanic residents, relative to the move-ins during the operating period
of trash sites.
Evidence of non-gentrification and job loss effects of MSW site closures is also implied by the results
that show decreases in median household income and median housing values in the site neighborhoods.
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Specifically, closing an MSW site led to 6.7 percent fall in median household income and 3.6 percent fall in
median housing values in 1-mile nearby blocks, relative to the period during which the site was operating.
The paper builds upon studies of residential sorting in response to changes in an environmental amenity,
by Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), and Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2011). Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) pre-
dict increased population density in neighborhoods that experience exogenous improvements in air quality,
suggesting that households vote with their feet for environmental quality. Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins
(2011) present evidence of residential sorting after Superfund remediation programs. Their method is less
prone to the endogeneity problems than Banzhaf and Walsh (2008)’s method because they exploit the risk
assessment under the Superfund program to compare neighborhoods of similar-risk toxic sites that received
cleanup treatment to those that did not. My paper exploits the spatial and temporal variations in the open-
ings and closings of MSW facilities to compare the change in population after these events between nearby
blocks within 1 mile of the sites and faraway blocks beyond 1 mile.
In addition to studies on residential sorting, the literature discusses the evidence of neighborhood gentri-
fication and the effects of environmental bads on human health. Currie et al. (2015) also exploit the spatial
variation and temporal variation in openings and closings of industrial plants to study their effects on hous-
ing values and infant’s health. Davis (2011) study the effects of operating power plants on local housing
values and rents. Greenstone and Gallagher (2008), and Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013) document
the effects of Superfund cleanups on housing values.
Those papers and the literature on environmental justice have studied the distribution of industrial plants
in the toxic release inventory database and the distribution of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities for
hazardous waste. I, on the other hand, focus on the impacts of municipal solid waste facilities. This is impor-
tant because closure of an MSW facility does not necessarily lead to in-migration. A closed MSW facility
stops receiving trash, but it does not receive any special treatment. Hence, the closed facility must have
both accumulated pollution over its operating period and the loss of jobs opportunities, thereby inducing
move-outs in local communities.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Facility Data
MSW facility data come from surveys by an industry survey company. The data survey quarterly volume
and price by facility from 1992 to 2016. I focus on the list from January 1992 to December 2010 that contain
a facility that ever operated in this period. The status of operating versus closing are based on annual price
value rather than volume value. Specifically, a facility is considered “operating” if it has a positive price
value. Yet, a few facilities continued receiving a small amount of trash for a few years after its price was
zero. There are three facilities that re-opened after closing for some years. Since those closing periods were
less than five years, I assume these facilities were active. I do not observe the facilities that closed before
1992.
Figure (3.1) shows the number of sites by type during the period 1992–2010. Most opening sites are
transfer stations and composting sites; only four opening sites are landfills. By contrast, most closing sites
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are landfills and demolition landfills. While most openings happened in 1995–1996, most closings appear
to continuously happen during 1990s. Figure (3.2) shows the map of closings and openings in California
between 1992 and 2000.
3.2.2 Demographic Data
Residency data come from aggregate data at the block level from the decennial census (accessed via
IPUMS NHGIS) for three years, 1990, 2000, and 2010. These data are available publicly and at the smallest
geographic unit the Census Bureau uses. Information at the block level includes total population, race, eth-
nicity, gender, age, number of house units, occupied houses, occupied-by-owner houses, number of house-
holders by race and ethnicity. Some economic variables are available only at the block group level, such as
education, median household income, median housing value, median gross rent, housing occupancy, hous-
ing tenure, population below poverty, household receiving public assistance income, household receiving
social security income. For these block-group variables, I assign count variables to block values based on
population shares.
Because US Census Bureau redesign census units from 1990 to 2010, I construct the panel of block by
year for years 1990, 2000, and 2010 by fixing the 2010 blocks and calculating the 1990 and 2000 infor-
mation for these blocks using NHGIS crosswalks. NHGIS crosswalks are similar to the US Census Bureau
relationship files, but NHGIS crosswalks provide interpolation weights to support the allocation of summary
data from 2000 blocks to a 2010 block. Each interpolation weight identifies approximately what portion of
the 2000 block’s population and housing units were located in its intersection with a 2010 block. So, for
each 2000 block, a share of each demographic count is assigned to a 2010 block based on the interpolation
weight.
I drop blocks that do not have any land areas. Due to missing values of demographic characteristics for
1990 blocks, the final sample of block by year include 565, 468 block observations in 1990 and 691, 487
observations in each of 2000 and 2010. Table (3.1) reports summary statistics of the characteristics of these
blocks by year.
To examine the change in residency due to exposure to a nearby MSW facility, I define the exposure
status of a block based on the distance from the block’s geographic centroid to the nearest facility. The
literature has suggested radii from one to three miles for TSDFs and toxic plants to capture the local effects
of environmental hazards. In this paper, I use one mile as the base line, and conduct sensitivity checks for
larger distances such as two miles and three miles. Using the status of MSW facilities, I can define the
exposure status of blocks at a point in time. For example, an “active” block is the block that is near to an
active facility; a “closed” block is the block that is near to a closed facility. Because the one-mile buffer of
a block may include several facilities, a “mixed” block is the block that is near to an active facility and also
to a closed facility. To ensure the mutual exclusivity of these categories, an “active” block is, hence, the
block that is near to only active facilities. Similarly, a “closed” block is the block that is near to only closed
facilities.
To estimate effects of openings and closings of MSW facilities, comparing a block that contains a facility
to a block that does not requires that these blocks must be similar in unobserved characteristics that could
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determine residential mobility. Rather than relying on similarity of levels, my approach uses difference-
in-difference strategy. This strategy relies on the assumption that trends in the unobserved determinants of
residential mobility are evolving similarly.
3.3 Evidence of Residential Sorting Using Panel Data
Given the panel data of blocks in three time periods, 1990, 2000, and 2010, and different timing of
openings and closings of MSW facilities, my difference-in-difference strategy exploits the variation in ge-
ographical and temporal exposure to a facility. Specifically, I compare the change in block outcome after
an opening/closing of a facility in exposed blocks, relative to unexposed blocks. Formally, the regression
model is:
Ybt = α11[Active]bt + α21[Closed]bt + α31[Mixed]bt + ηb + η˜t + bt (3.1)
where Ybt is the resident level (by race and ethnicity) of block b in year t. Indicator 1[Active]b equals 1 if
block b contains only active facilities within its one mile buffer of its centroid in year t. Indicator 1[Closed]bt
equals 1 if block b contains only closed facilities within its one mile buffer of its centroid in year t. Indicator
1[Mixed]bt equals 1 if block b contains an active facility and another closed facility within its one mile buffer
of its centroid in year t. The left-out category is blocks with no facility at all, within one mile.
The regression includes block fixed effects ηb to control for all time-invariant determinants of residency
in a block, and year fixed effects η˜t to control for factors that are common across blocks in the same year.
The inclusion of these fixed effects ensures that identification comes from facility openings and closings.
The year fixed effects are also important since they provide model flexibility to capture the fact that different
blocks may be exposed to an operating facility at different times. The standard errors are clustered by tract
to allow each tract to have different economic and demographic structure, and blocks within the tract to
share similar activities. An alternative is to cluster by block group. However, even block groups may be
small units and share similar economic conditions within a tract. Additionally, facilities may locate on block
and block group borders, which makes clustering by tract more appropriate. Of course, one can also cluster
by adjacent group of block groups and/or adjacent group of tracts to fully account for spatial correlation
resulted from near-border facility siting.
The parameters of interest are α1 and α2, which measure the effects of openings and closings of MSW
facilities, relative to the period before opening, respectively. Specifically, parameter α1 measures the effect
on population level in nearby blocks, relative to faraway blocks, during the period that the facility is operat-
ing, relative to the period before it opened. Parameter α2 measures the effect on population level in nearby
blocks, relative to faraway blocks, during the period that the facility is closing, relative to the period before
it opened. Variable 1[Mixed]bt is mainly to control for blocks that have multiple facilities and that have an
active facility and a closing facility. Parameter α3 is not the main interest, although it captures the effect of
having both an active facility and a closing facility relative to the period before operating.
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To test the effect of closing relative to the operating period, I use the following regression:
Ybt = β11[Near]bt + β21[Closed]bt + ηb + η˜t + bt (3.2)
where 1[Near]bt equals 1 if block b contains any facility, either closing or opening, within its one mile buffer
of its centroid in year t. The parameter of interest is β2, which measure the effect of closing relative to
operating period. Parameter β1 measures the effect of openings, which is in fact equal to α1.
There are several channels for the effects of closing an MSW facility. To relate the effects of closings
to causes by pollution versus job loss, I decompose the effect of closings into the effect of closings due to
environmental regulation and the effect of closings due to economic condition and the operation of a facility
itself. Specifically, I decompose the effect of closings into the effect of closings that began in 1992–1996 and
the effect of closings that began afterward. Due to the 1992 RCRA regulation, the closings happening during
1992–1996 should have resulted from the strict regulation, while the closures started from 1997 should be
accounted by the operation process of facilities. This pattern can be supported in figure (3.1), which shows
a sharp increase in closures from 1992 to 1996 and a jump in openings of transfer stations (which were not
subject to RCRA regulation).
I hypothesize that closings resulting from environmental regulation would affect population by pollu-
tion channels. Sites that are forced to close by regulation are more heavily polluted than other sites, and
hence induce more out-migration. Although one may argue that sites that are forced to close by regulation
would receive environmental remediation and hence attract new move-ins, this is not likely the case for
MSW facilities. Closures of MSW facilities under 1992 RCRA did not receive any special treatment from
the Superfund program for hazardous waste sites. MSW facilities were forced to close under 1992 RCRA
because these sites did not meet new environmental regulations such as installing methane and water moni-
toring. Hence, closed sites under 1992 RCRA are likely to irritate their neighborhoods more than other sites.
This would result in greater out-migration at these sites for those who have high preferences to avoid living
near a trash site. On the other hand, closures resulted from the downturn operation of a facility are highly
associated with large job loss. As a result, there would be exits for those who had preferences to move into
neighborhoods of trash sites for employment.
The control group I have used so far is the group of blocks beyond one mile from the facility location.
If there is any impact on neighborhoods within two miles, for example, this would result in bias against my
findings using one-mile neighborhoods. To explore the effects of openings and closings by distance to the
environmental bads, I use the following regression:
Ybt =
6∑
d=1
δd1[Active from (d− 1) to d miles]bt
+
6∑
d=1
γd1[Closed from (d− 1) to d miles]bt
+
6∑
d=1
ωd1[Mixed from (d− 1) to d miles]bt + ηb + η˜t + bt (3.3)
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where 1[Active from (d− 1) to d miles]bt equals 1 if the distance from the centroid of block b to the nearest
active facility is between (d − 1) miles to d miles and there is no closed facility in that range. Indica-
tor 1[Closed from (d− 1) to d miles]bt equals 1 if the distance from the centroid of block b to the nearest
closed facility is between (d − 1) miles to d miles and there is no active facility in that range. Indicator
1[Mixed from (d− 1) to d miles]bt equals 1 if the distances from the centroid of block b to the nearest ac-
tive facility and the nearest closed facility are between (d − 1) miles to d miles. Parameters of interest are
δs and γs, which measure the effects of opening and closing of a trash facility by distance, relative to the
areas beyond 6 miles, respectively.
Before turning to the results, I consider some of potential limitations associated with the data and the
empirical design. First, I do not have information on closings that happened before 1992. The control group
in my analysis potentially include blocks that have closed facilities that I did not observe. This information
missing, however, is not a problem because it would create bias against my findings. Second, I do not have
more frequent data on population by year to distinguish the short-run and long-run effects of openings and
closings and do event analysis. Missing yearly data also prevents me from conducting a parallel trend test
(to test the identification assumption of difference-in-difference model) and Granger causality test (to test
whether causes happen before consequences and not vice versa). Third, I do not have additional regressors to
control for time variant characteristics. Conventional methods would use block characteristics before 1990,
interacted with a time trend, to control for block-by-time specific characteristics. However, the Census
Bureau completely redesigned census geography with the 1990 Census, and nothing comparable between
1980 blocks and 1990 blocks. Our results, however, show that block fixed effects and year fixed effects
already do a good job in explaining the block population, evident by high values of R squared.
3.4 Results
Table (3.2) reports estimates for the effects of openings and closings on residency by race and ethnicity.
Panel A shows the effects on population. Panel B shows the effects on number of households by race and
ethnicity of householder. The estimates are the coefficients of regression model (3.1), columns (1)–(4), and
model (3.2), columns (5)–(8). I estimate these models on a unbalanced panel of block-by-year observations
for years 1990, 2000, and 2010. The panel is unbalanced due to missing values of some blocks in 1990.
The estimates in panel A show that an operating MSW facility within one mile is associated with sig-
nificant decreases in white population and black population, but a significant increase in Hispanic residents.
Using the block mean population in 1990, this implies a decrease of 11 percent in the white population, a
decrease of 32 percent in black population, and an increase of 44 percent in Hispanic population in a block.
Closures of MSW facility result in a further significant decrease of 14 percent in black population, and a
significant fall of 11 percent in Hispanic population, relative to operating period.
Results in panel B show effects of openings and closings on the number of households that are consistent
with results in panel A. Specifically, using the block mean household in 1990, an opening of an MSW
facility within one mile is associated with a 13 percent decrease in white-head households, a 26 percent
decrease in black-head households, and a 39 percent in Hispanic-head households. Relative to the operating
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period, closings result in a further 3 percent decrease in white-head households, a 10 percent in black-
head household, but a 24 percent increase in Asian-head households, and negligible effect on Hispanic
households.
These estimates suggest a significant pattern of white and black exits and Hispanic move-ins in neigh-
borhoods of operating MSW facilities. The white exit can be explained by two reasons. First, white residents
may have higher willingness to avoid unpleasant surroundings of trash sites. Second, white residents may
have more resources to move away from the sites than Hispanic residents. Meanwhile, Hispanic residents
may find job opportunities in neighborhoods of operating MSW facilities to move in. Alternatively, Hispanic
people may find affordable housing and living options in these affected areas due to income constraints.
The negative effects of closing, relative to operating period, on all three racial groups suggest that closing
sites may be more heavily polluted than operating sites or destroy job opportunities. Although time-variant
characteristics are not controlled in the regressions, several important determinants of block residency have
been controlled by block fixed effects and year fixed effects. High values of adjusted R squared helps
increase our confidence in the validity of the estimates.
To relate the effects of closings to reasons of pollution and job loss, I decompose the effect of closings
into the effect of closings due to environmental regulation and the effect of closings as an organization and
operation process of a facility. Specifically, table (3.3) decomposes the effect of closings into the effect of
closings happening since 1992–1996 (due to RCRA regulation) and the effect of closings from 1997 (due to
volunteer operation process of facilities). The estimates show that regulation-forced closures result in much
bigger exit by white residents and bigger move-ins by Hispanic people. This verifies the conjecture that
sites that are forced to close by regulation are more heavily polluted than operating sites, resulting bigger
exit by white residents. On the other hand, closures resulted from the downturn operation of a facility lead
to larger job loss, resulting in significant move-outs of those Hispanic residents that had moved in during
the operating period of trash sites.
I also examine the effects of openings and closings on other outcomes. Since these variables are in-
terpolated from block group levels, the estimates are much less robust than the effects on residency level.
Table (3.4) reports the effects on median household income, median housing values, and median gross rent.
Four interesting facts emerge. First, neighborhoods of MSW facilities earn less than faraway areas. Second,
neighborhoods of closed facilities earn much less. This suggests that closures of MSW facilities result in
job loss for their neighborhoods. Third, neighborhoods of closed facilities have much lower value after
closure than during the operating period before the facility closed. This verifies the above conjecture that a
closed facility is associated with high pollution level, and that closing does not remedy the environmental
hazards, at least for the 10-year period. Additionally, the low housing values after closures suggest that
facilities do not close because of high land costs, if closing decisions reflect expected future costs. Fourth,
post-1997 closures are associated with higher decrease in income and house values, which again suggests
these closures are highly likely to destroy jobs.
In all regressions the comparison group is blocks that do not contain any facilities within one mile from
the blocks’ centroids. To examine the sensitivity of the results on the definition of affected communities, I
explore the spatial effects of openings and closings by distance to hazards. Examining the effects of facility
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operation in distance is helpful because channels of unwanted elements from MSW facilities such as smells,
toxic emissions, water pollution have geographical affects, and dwindle in distance. Figure (3.3) plots the
coefficients δ’s, γs and their 95th percentile confidence intervals. It shows the marginal effect of an operating
facility on resident level with respect to distance to the nearest MSW facility. Overall, the marginal effect
of an opening of a trash site fades with distance. Point estimates for the effects of white exit and Hispanic
move-ins are significant for blocks within 4 miles of an opening of a trash site and fade away beyond 4
miles. Closing a trash site does not result in a significant improvement of amenities to recover to the period
before opening. Since trash is cumulated into a site over time, closure reflects an end after many years of
operations. Hence, we can see residential mobility due to an opening of a trash site has spread into larger
areas surrounding the site. The Hispanic move-ins and the white exit patterns are still highest in the nearest
neighborhoods of the sites.
Tables (C.1) and (C.2) in the appendix reestimate the effects of opening and closing in 2-mile neighbor-
hoods and 3-mile neighborhoods, respectively. Results confirm smaller effects in extended neighborhoods
than the 1-mile neighborhoods.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence of residential mobility in the surroundings of MSW facilities. Opening
a trash site induces a significant decrease in white residents, but an increase in Hispanic residents in 1-
mile nearby blocks. While the literature has documented sizable in-migration after Superfund cleanup (18
percent increase in population density, Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2011)) or reduced exposure to TRI
pollution (5–7 percent increase in population, Banzhaf and Walsh (2008)), this paper shows that there is no
significant in-migration after closing an MSW facility. Closure, however, results in out-migration. A reason
is that waste has been accumulated over time into a site. A closed MSW facility only stops receiving trash,
but it does not receive any special treatment. The closed facility must have accumulated pollution over its
operating periods, and hence induce a higher white exit and a larger area of affection by distance. Closure
also reduces Hispanic move-ins considerably due to job destructions.
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Figures and Tables
FIGURE 3.1: Overview of municipal solid waste facilities in CA from Jan 1992 to Dec 2010
(A) Number of operating sites
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(B) Number of new closings
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(C) Number of new openings
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Note: The graph shows the number of MSW sites by type and year. Operating sites are active sites that have positive price values.
New closings refer to sites that have just closed in that year. New openings refer to sites that have just opened in that year.
Demolition landfills are basically landfills that accept construction and demolition waste.
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FIGURE 3.2: Map of new openings and closings of MSW facilities in CA from Jan 1992 to Dec 2010
(A) New openings during 1992–1996 (B) New closings during 1992–1996
(C) New closings during 1997–2000 (D) New closings during 2001–2010
Note: The graph shows the locations of new openings and new closings of MSW facilities in California from January 1992 to
December 2010. MSW facilities are divided into three categories: LF, TS, and CO. LF denotes a landfill that includes an MSW
landfill, an incinerator, or a demolition site. TS implies a transfer station that includes a transfer station or a material recovery site.
CO implies a composting site.
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FIGURE 3.3: The effects of openings and closings on population by distance
(A) The effects of being near to an active facility
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Note: The graph shows the effects of living near an opening and closing of an MSW facility by distance. The figures were
constructed by regressing population level on indicators for the distances to the nearest opening/closing MSW site, and block and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by tract. Reported are the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals for the
opening/closing events happening between d − 1 miles and d miles to the block’s centroid. These are the marginal effects on
population level in the blocks that are near to an opening/closing site, relative to blocks that are beyond 6 miles away.
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TABLE 3.1: Characteristics of blocks by year
1990 2000 2010
count percentage count percentage mean percentage
total blocks 565,468 691,487 691,487
active blocks 42,805 7.57% 60,667 8.77% 52,432 7.58%
closed blocks 0 0% 10,148 1.47% 16,942 2.45%
mixed blocks 0 0% 3,686 0.01% 5,859 0.01%
mean sd mean sd mean sd
population 52.63 108.51 48.98 113.84 53.88 121.89
white 30.11 64.13 22.87 55.27 21.63 52.96
Asian 4.79 19.46 5.28 23.46 6.91 28.81
black 3.70 20.42 3.16 18.94 3.13 18.43
Hispanic 13.60 46.31 15.86 55.00 20.27 61.60
household 18.36 38.46 16.63 38.66 18.19 41.37
white household 12.37 28.08 9.69 24.58 9.41 23.80
Asian household 1.32 5.52 1.59 7.51 2.18 9.75
black household 1.28 6.74 1.12 6.07 1.17 5.93
Hispanic household 3.25 10.16 3.71 12.21 4.90 14.39
median household income 39425.17 30255.36 45437.47 29269.67 50424.88 26446.30
median housing value 52866.52 40570.41 46979.29 30262.88 39814.08 20881.26
median gross rent 642.63 443.18 715.51 436.88 850.18 421.48
Note: This table reports characteristics of blocks by year, after reassigning 1990 values and 2000 values to 2010 blocks, using
NHGIS crosswalk links and weights. Year 1990 has a smaller number of blocks due to missing values.
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TABLE 3.2: Effects of openings and closings of MSW facilities on 1-mile neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
white Asian black Hispanic white Asian black Hispanic
Panel A: Effects on resident population
active -3.328∗∗∗ -0.352 -1.205∗∗∗ 5.959∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.347) (0.324) (0.888)
closed -3.977∗∗∗ 0.068 -1.737∗∗∗ 4.416∗∗∗ -0.630 0.443 -0.531∗∗ -1.518∗∗
(0.857) (0.610) (0.401) (1.138) (0.563) (0.496) (0.260) (0.758)
mixed -4.232∗∗∗ -1.466∗∗ -1.247∗∗∗ 4.800∗∗∗
(1.118) (0.637) (0.438) (1.334)
near -3.342∗∗∗ -0.369 -1.206∗∗∗ 5.941∗∗∗
(0.612) (0.347) (0.324) (0.888)
adj. R2 0.841 0.745 0.743 0.823 0.841 0.745 0.743 0.823
Panel B: Effects on resident households
active -1.584∗∗∗ -0.051 -0.329∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.108) (0.106) (0.190)
closed -2.022∗∗∗ 0.256 -0.451∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ -0.428∗ 0.315∗ -0.123∗ -0.267
(0.366) (0.217) (0.123) (0.252) (0.257) (0.187) (0.073) (0.175)
mixed -2.052∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.306∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.184) (0.140) (0.290)
near -1.592∗∗∗ -0.057 -0.328∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.108) (0.106) (0.190)
adj. R2 0.883 0.742 0.864 0.852 0.883 0.742 0.864 0.852
N 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442
Note: This table reports estimates for the effects of openings and closings on residency by race and ethnicity. Panel A shows the
effects on population. Panel B shows the effects on number of households by race and ethnicity of householder. The estimates are
the coefficients of regression models (3.1) and (3.2). I estimate these models on a unbalanced panel of block-by-year observations
for years 1990, 2000, and 2010. The panel is unbalanced due to missing values of some blocks in 1990. All models include block
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by tract.
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TABLE 3.3: Effects of pre-1997 and post-1997 closings of MSW facilities on 1-mile neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
white Asian black Hispanic white Asian black Hispanic
active -3.409∗∗∗ -0.376 -1.194∗∗∗ 5.913∗∗∗ -3.382∗∗∗ -0.282 -1.201∗∗∗ 5.966∗∗∗
(0.610) (0.349) (0.322) (0.885) (0.610) (0.345) (0.324) (0.889)
pre-1997 closed -6.066∗∗∗ 1.952 -1.623∗∗∗ 4.530∗∗∗ -6.036∗∗∗ 2.052 -1.630∗∗∗ 4.587∗∗∗
(1.175) (1.370) (0.522) (1.559) (1.176) (1.379) (0.523) (1.568)
post-1997 closed -3.479∗∗∗ -0.731 -1.771∗∗∗ 4.289∗∗∗ -3.454∗∗∗ -0.645 -1.777∗∗∗ 4.338∗∗∗
(0.916) (0.589) (0.435) (1.215) (0.917) (0.592) (0.437) (1.219)
multi-closed 3.584 12.207∗∗ -0.933∗ 6.964
(11.043) (5.487) (0.546) (9.963)
mixed -4.284∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗ -1.224∗∗∗ 4.723∗∗∗ -4.231∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗ -1.238∗∗∗ 4.825∗∗∗
(1.106) (0.627) (0.435) (1.318) (1.127) (0.654) (0.440) (1.345)
adj. R2 0.841 0.745 0.743 0.823 0.841 0.745 0.743 0.823
Note: This table decompose the effect of closings into the effect of closings happening since 1992–1996 and the effect of closings
from 1997. “Multi-closed” indicates multi-site blocks that contain a site that closed in pre-1997 period and a site that closed in
post-1997 period. I estimate these models on a unbalanced panel of block-by-year observations for years 1990, 2000, and 2010.
The panel is unbalanced due to missing values of some blocks in 1990. All models include block and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by tract.
TABLE 3.4: Effects of openings and closings economic conditions of 1-mile neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
median household income median housing value median gross rent
active -4505.3∗∗∗ -4403.5∗∗∗ -2045.4∗∗∗ -1935.2∗∗ -69.5∗∗∗ -68.5∗∗∗
(612.5) (609.1) (765.9) (763.8) (10.0) (10.0)
closed -7215.6∗∗∗ -2646.6∗∗∗ -3965.5∗∗∗ -1925.1∗ -84.6∗∗∗ -13.4
(1112.4) (886.4) (1349.4) (1067.5) (17.6) (13.7)
mixed -7507.0∗∗∗ -7354.4∗∗∗ -1811.8 -1674.1 -147.0∗∗∗ -145.4∗∗∗
(1961.6) (1950.4) (1835.5) (1821.6) (24.6) (24.5)
near -4552.3∗∗∗ -2041.7∗∗∗ -70.7∗∗∗
(619.2) (772.1) (10.1)
pre-97 closed -5750.3∗∗∗ -1550.6 -87.7∗∗∗
(1744.0) (1733.9) (23.4)
post-97 closed -7560.9∗∗∗ -4606.1∗∗∗ -81.4∗∗∗
(1236.1) (1523.1) (19.9)
adj. R2 0.649 0.649 0.649 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.471 0.471 0.471
Note: This table reports estimates for the effects of openings and closings on median household income and housing values in
blocks that contain an exposed facility within 1 miles from the blocks’ centroids. I estimate these models on a unbalanced panel of
block-by-year observations for years 1990, 2000, and 2010. The panel is unbalanced due to missing values of some blocks in 1990.
All models include block and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by tract.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Monopoly Pricing Under Marginal Price Response
Let the indirect utility from the IC constraint be V (θ) ≡ maxqU(q, θ)−Pm(q). Following the standard
literature results, the IC constraint requires that Qm(θ) weakly increases in θ and that the marginal surplus
Vθ > 0. The IR constraint is satisfied if and only if V (θ0) ≥ 0 (the utility of the lowest type is nonnegative),
given that Vθ > 0. The expected profits can be written in terms of expected total surplus minus consumer
surplus: ∫ θ1
θ0
(P (Qm(θ))− C(Qm(θ)))dF (θ)
=
∫ θ1
θ0
(U(Qm(θ), θ)− C(Qm(θ))− V (θ))dF (θ)
=
∫ θ1
θ0
(
(U(Qm(θ)), θ)− C(Qm(θ))− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
· U(Qm(θ), θ)− V (θ0)
)
dF (θ) (A.1)
The last equation is obtained by using integration by parts. Hence, the firm’s pricing problem is trans-
formed to the problem of choosing Qm(θ) to maximize A.1 subject to Q(θ) nondecreasing and V (θ0) ≥ 0.
The optimal price schedule is recovered from U(Qm(θ), θ) − P (Q(θ)) = V (θ), where V (θ) = V (θ0) +∫ θ1
θ0
Uθ(Q
m(θ), θ)dθ. Solving these gives the following results.
Result 1. When the consumer responds to marginal price, the optimal consumption qm = max{Qm(θ), 0}
where qm = Qm(θ) satisfies:
Uq − Cq = 1− F
f
· Uqθ (A.2)
The optimal price schedule Pm(q) satisfies:
Uq(Q
m(θ), θ)− Pmq (Qm(θ)) = 0 (A.3)
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We also have
Qmθ is nondecreasing (A.4)
V (θ0) = U(Q
m(θ0), θ0)− Pm(Q(θ0)) ≥ 0 (A.5)
A.2 Regulated Firm Pricing Under Marginal Price Response
Similar to the monopoly pricing framework, the optimization problem can be transformed into
max
q
∫ θ1
θ0
U(q, θ)− C(q)dθ (A.6)
s.t.
∫ θ1
θ0
(
(U(Qm(θ)), θ)− C(Qm(θ))− 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
· U(Qm(θ), θ)− V (θ0)
)
dF (θ) = FC (A.7)
q increasing in θ (A.8)
U(q(θ0), θ0) ≥ 0 (A.9)
Using the Lagrangian function and its first order condition, we get
Result 2. When the consumer responds to marginal price, the optimal consumption qm = max{Qm(θ), 0}
where q = Qm(θ) satisfies:
Uq − Cq =
(
λ
1 + λ
)
·
(
1− F
f
· Uqθ
)
(A.10)
The optimal price schedule Pm(q) satisfies:
Uq(Q
m(θ), θ)− Pmq (Qm(θ)) = 0 (A.11)
We also have
Qmθ is nondecreasing (A.12)
V (θ0) = U(Q
m(θ0), θ0)− Pm(Q(θ0)) ≥ 0 (A.13)
Notice this means
MP −MC
MP
=
R

(A.14)
whereR ∈ [0, 1] is Ramsey number and  is price elasticity of demand for qth unit across all types.
 =
f
1− F ·
Uq
Uqθ
(A.15)
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A.3 Omitted Proofs
Demonstration of Corollary . Remind that under MP response, we have:
MP −MC
AP
=
Rm

(A.16)
⇔ 1− MC
MP
=
Rm

(A.17)
Hence if  is constant (and the cost is strictly convex) or increasing in q then the marginal price is decreasing.
Demonstration of Corollary . We have
AP −MC
AP
=
Ra
η
(A.18)
⇔ 1− MC
AP
=
Ra
η
(A.19)
Hence if η is constant (and the cost is strictly convex) or increasing in q then the average price is increasing.
Demonstration of Corollary . When consumers respond to marginal price, the optimal pricing scheme sat-
isfies
Uq − Cq
Uq
= Rm · 1− F
f
· Uqθ
Uq
(A.20)
⇒ MP −MC
MP
=
Rm

=
Rm
f
1−F · θ
(A.21)
Notice that ddq =
d
dθ
dθ
dq = (
dh
dθ θ + h(θ))
dθ
dq where h(θ) is the hazard rate
f
1−F . Since we have
dθ
dq > 0,
the increasing hazard rate implies the increasing elasticity, thus decreasing marginal price, and decreasing
average rate.
When consumers respond to average price, the optimal pricing scheme satisfies
Uq − Cq
Uq
= Ra · −qUqq
Uq
(A.22)
⇒ AP −MC
AP
= Ra · −qVqq
Vq
(A.23)
Therefore, the increasing curvature implies the increasing average price.
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B.1 Data Handling and Format
Waste amount data are merged with price data for the period from January 1995 to December 2015.
0.52% of California waste is sent to disposal facilities that are not found in the price dataset. I drop those
observations to keep only matching observations. I continue to filter the matching data in three important
aspects. First, some time-facility observations in the price dataset have zero price. Since zero prices may be
recorded due to missing values, I drop those observations. They represent 0.41% of the total waste amount.
Second, three facilities in California are located on Santa Catalina island and San Clemente island. Since
these facilities are built for local needs and the waste management in islands is isolated from other areas
in mainland due to geographical and transportation constraints, I drop those observations. They account
for 0.01% of the total waste amount. Third, some disposal facilities in California share the same facility
code in the price dataset. This arises from the shutting down and opening of a new facility or expanding a
sub-unit in the same area but requiring a new permit number registration from the state. I combine waste
amounts at different permitted number facilities that share the same price-data identifier to consider them as
one disposal facility.
For out-of-state exports in California solid waste, I observe the export amount, but I do not observe the
place of destination.1 I construct an out-of-state disposal option for haulers in California by assuming a
hauler would export to a nearest out-of-state facility, if export is considered.
I also construct a hypothetical out-of-state option for haulers in a specific county by the following pro-
cedure. A group of out-of-state facilities within a radius from the centroid location of the county is taken.
A characteristic (e.g. price and driving distance) of the hypothetical out-of-state option is the average of the
corresponding characteristic of all facilities in that group weighted by either trash volume of those facili-
ties or inverse driving distance. Waste volume and inverse traveling distance of a facility are considered as
weights because they highlight the importance of the facility’s presence in the market. The analysis results
using this alternative process does not change the main results. Overall, out-of-state exports make up a very
small amount of California solid waste, 1.16% during this whole period.
1Since 2006, the state of destination has been observed but the out-of-state facility of destination has still not been available.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3 Appendix
C.1 Redefine the Areas of Affected Communities
TABLE C.1: Effects of openings and closings of MSW facilities on 2-mile neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
white Asian black Hispanic white Asian black Hispanic
Panel A: Effects on resident population
active -3.450∗∗∗ 0.339 -1.391∗∗∗ 6.511∗∗∗
(0.537) (0.270) (0.221) (0.663)
closed -5.004∗∗∗ 2.271∗∗∗ -1.559∗∗∗ 6.005∗∗∗ -1.415∗∗∗ 1.940∗∗∗ -0.139 -0.597
(0.757) (0.488) (0.289) (0.864) (0.502) (0.398) (0.197) (0.567)
mixed -5.469∗∗∗ 0.205 -1.811∗∗∗ 7.832∗∗∗
(0.745) (0.424) (0.322) (0.913)
near -3.443∗∗∗ 0.340 -1.390∗∗∗ 6.506∗∗∗
(0.537) (0.270) (0.220) (0.662)
adj. R2 0.842 0.745 0.743 0.823 0.842 0.745 0.743 0.823
Panel B: Effects on resident households
active -1.388∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.090) (0.076) (0.141)
closed -2.132∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ 1.413∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ -0.039 -0.067
(0.307) (0.180) (0.099) (0.192) (0.215) (0.151) (0.059) (0.130)
mixed -2.422∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ 1.829∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.136) (0.105) (0.198)
near -1.385∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ -0.382∗∗∗ 1.454∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.090) (0.076) (0.141)
adj. R2 0.883 0.742 0.864 0.852 0.883 0.742 0.864 0.852
N 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442
Note: This table reports estimates for the effects of openings and closings on residency by race and ethnicity in blocks that contain
an exposed facility within 2 miles from the blocks’ centroids. Panel A shows the effects on population. Panel B shows the effects
on number of households by race and ethnicity of householder. The estimates are the coefficients of regression models (3.1) and
(3.2). I estimate these models on a unbalanced panel of block-by-year observations for years 1990, 2000, and 2010. The panel is
unbalanced due to missing values of some blocks in 1990. All models include block and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by tract.
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TABLE C.2: Effects of openings and closings of MSW facilities on 3-mile neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
white Asian black Hispanic white Asian black Hispanic
Panel A: Effects on resident population
active -2.559∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ -1.042∗∗∗ 4.817∗∗∗
(0.532) (0.271) (0.186) (0.586)
closed -3.655∗∗∗ 3.154∗∗∗ -0.929∗∗∗ 4.240∗∗∗ -0.690 2.165∗∗∗ 0.227 -0.899∗
(0.766) (0.476) (0.252) (0.784) (0.520) (0.383) (0.170) (0.517)
mixed -5.652∗∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗ -1.912∗∗∗ 7.270∗∗∗
(0.662) (0.390) (0.239) (0.747)
near -2.392∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗ 4.685∗∗∗
(0.533) (0.271) (0.186) (0.585)
adj. R2 0.842 0.745 0.743 0.823 0.841 0.745 0.743 0.823
Panel B: Effects on resident households
active -0.856∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.091) (0.064) (0.126)
closed -1.453∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ -0.408∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.039 -0.121
(0.300) (0.170) (0.089) (0.177) (0.212) (0.138) (0.053) (0.121)
mixed -2.295∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ 1.745∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.130) (0.079) (0.164)
near -0.778∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.092) (0.064) (0.126)
adj. R2 0.883 0.743 0.864 0.852 0.883 0.743 0.864 0.852
N 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442 1948442
Note: This table reports estimates for the effects of openings and closings on residency by race and ethnicity in blocks that contain
an exposed facility within 3 miles from the blocks’ centroids. Panel A shows the effects on population. Panel B shows the effects
on number of households by race and ethnicity of householder. The estimates are the coefficients of regression models (3.1) and
(3.2). I estimate these models on a unbalanced panel of block-by-year observations for years 1990, 2000, and 2010. The panel is
unbalanced due to missing values of some blocks in 1990. All models include block and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by tract.
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